The UN Is Not Broken: Structural Design Limits Conflict Resolution

This analytical article from the Lowy Institute argues that the United Nations is not broken but functions exactly as its founders intended. The author contends that common criticisms regarding the UN's paralysis in major conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Iran, stem from a mismatch between institutional design and public expectations. The Security Council's veto power, held by permanent members, was a foundational compromise to keep major powers engaged, preventing a collapse similar to the League of Nations. While bureaucratic reforms could improve efficiency in areas like humanitarian coordination and peacekeeping where major power interests align or are limited, they cannot resolve deadlocks when great power interests collide. The article suggests that expanding the Security Council would likely multiply veto points rather than solve underlying issues. Ultimately, the UN should be understood as an organization capable of mitigating violence and supporting recovery in specific contexts, but incapable of acting as a global policeman or impartial arbiter in high-stakes geopolitical conflicts involving permanent members.