CFR: Europe Must Step Up to Shape New Security Architecture for Russia-Ukraine War
Editorial responsibility
- No named human review is recorded for this page.
- Source reporting is collected, normalized, translated or condensed automatically when needed.
- Automatically published source-backed update
Following inconclusive trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Abu Dhabi, the Council on Foreign Relations argues that European leaders must actively shape a new security architecture to resolve the conflict. While European capitals fear discussing broader security issues before a ceasefire empowers Russia, the article contends this position is untenable as the war is intrinsically linked to NATO expansion and continental defense. The analysis suggests a compromise: establishing a framework agreement on principles for future security alongside a credible commitment to detailed negotiations post-ceasefire. Europe faces the urgent challenge of defining a coherent voice and representation to engage directly with Moscow, moving beyond the view of being a U.S. vassal to achieving an equilibrium of competitive coexistence.
Source report
The recent trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi involving the United States, Russia, and Ukraine did not yield an immediate breakthrough in ending the war. While no one expected a sudden resolution given the vast gaps between the belligerents' positions, reports from the gathering and subsequent follow-up meetings between U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicate that all sides remain committed to building on positive momentum.
The Imperative for Negotiation
Despite maximalist public rhetoric from the Kremlin, both Russia and Ukraine are intensifying their search for an exit strategy. This shift is driven by rapidly mounting political, economic, and demographic costs of the conflict. However, the success of this diplomatic push depends heavily on Europe's role—not merely as a participant in current diplomacy, but as a central subject in discussions regarding a future European security order.
Divergent Views on European Security
The inclusion of broader European security architecture questions in the trilateral talks has raised alarm bells in key European capitals. Many European leaders have long insisted that a ceasefire must precede substantive discussions on security. Consequently, they viewed the agreement to discuss these issues as a significant concession to Russia, fearing Moscow aims to:
- Erode NATO's position in Eastern Europe.
- Drive wedges between NATO allies.
- Prolong the war by insisting that "root causes" (including security architecture) must be resolved before a ceasefire can be agreed upon.
However, the European position of separating security talks from ceasefire negotiations is increasingly untenable. The war is intrinsically linked to European security, a point Russia emphasized in draft treaties released two months prior to its invasion. These drafts contained three core demands:
- No further NATO expansion eastward.
- No deployment of deep-strike weapons capable of reaching Russian territory in NATO states.
- Withdrawal of NATO infrastructure to the lines established in 1997 (the year of the NATO-Russia Founding Act), predating the first post-Cold War wave of eastern expansion.
While one need not accept Moscow's claim that NATO posed an existential threat, it is clear that issues central to current settlement talks—such as Ukraine's relationship to NATO, Western-backed security guarantees, and potential limitations on military capabilities—directly impact future European security arrangements.
A Framework for Compromise
Reaching a consensus on a new European security order will be a gradual process, similar to the evolution of Cold War and post-Cold War arrangements. Therefore, the Russian demand that "root causes" be fully resolved before a settlement is also untenable; waiting for such an agreement would result in unending war.
The Proposed Solution: The goal should be a framework agreement that includes:
- Principles and parameters underpinning a future security order.
- A credible commitment to commence detailed negotiations once a ceasefire is achieved.
This approach offers a compromise between the European stance (no security talks without a ceasefire) and the Russian stance (no ceasefire until security talks are complete).
Defining the Limits of Europe
The resolution of the war will define the geopolitical limits of Europe. Any settlement will formalize the border between Russia and Europe, stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.
- West of the line: Will constitute the geopolitical zone of Europe.
- East of the line: Will include Belarus, Russia, and potentially Moldova, forming a distinct geopolitical zone.
This geographical reality would effectively end NATO expansion eastward, satisfying a key Russian security requirement. A new security order requires establishing an equilibrium between Europe and Russia. While cooperation based on shared values may be difficult to restore, an arrangement featuring transparency, arms control, and confidence-building measures could reduce the risk of devastating conflict, laying the foundation for a long-term relationship of "competitive coexistence."
Europe's Role in the Process
Building this new order necessitates active European participation. The United States recognizes this, having consulted European capitals and supporting the creation of a dedicated Europe-Russia channel.
Russia also acknowledges the necessity of engaging Europe. Tensions between Europe and the U.S. under the Trump administration have disrupted Moscow's previous conviction that Europe was merely a U.S. vassal. While U.S. envoys and Putin appear to have agreed to European participation, Kremlin messaging remains vague; spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 13 that Russia is willing to talk with Europe "if the Europeans truly have someone who is authorized to hold discussions."
Challenges in Articulating a Unified Voice
Europe now faces the challenge of deciding how to participate and articulating a coherent position. Building consensus within Europe is difficult:
- Criticism of Outreach: Recent outreach by Finnish and Norwegian leaders to Putin was criticized in some capitals for breaking with coordinated efforts.
- E3 Efforts: France, Germany, and the UK (the E3) are reportedly seeking to build a channel to Moscow.
- Regional Fears: Poland and others fear that major European powers may negotiate with Russia over the heads of other states.
To participate effectively, Europe must decide who will represent it. There does not necessarily need to be a single interlocutor. For instance, E3 national security advisors could join multilateral talks while Finnish and Norwegian leaders maintain direct conversations with Putin. However, the roles of these various channels must be clearly delineated and smoothly coordinated.
Conclusion
Peace is not yet imminent, but it is now thinkable in a way it has not been since the invasion began nearly five years ago. While the United States has played the central role in launching these negotiations, European participation is now acknowledged as indispensable by all sides.
The task before Europe is to determine what it wishes to accomplish, identify what can be reasonably achieved within a specific timeframe, and finally, designate who will represent it as diplomacy accelerates to end this devastating war.
Disclaimer: This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
Source
Council on Foreign RelationsNeutral / independent
Part of this Story
CFR and ECFR Urge Europe to Define Security Order After Abu Dhabi Talks