Greece approves over €3 bln for 'Achilles Shield' air defense architecture with Israeli systems

The Greek Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence has approved armament programmes totalling €4.2 billion. Over €3 billion of this amount will be allocated to the Achilles Shield, a project intended to become the new foundation of Greek air and missile defence.

Israeli Systems at the Core

Athens plans to acquire three complementary Israeli systems:

• Spyder AiO – for short-range threats
• Barak MX – covering the intermediate layer
• David’s Sling – protection against longer-range missiles

The entire structure will be connected through a new command-and-control system supported by artificial intelligence and modern radars.

A Unified Architecture

The significance of this decision extends beyond the systems themselves. Greece aims to connect sensors, interceptors, and command structures into a single architecture capable of:

• Collecting information
• Analysing threats
• Selecting the appropriate response

In modern warfare, the effectiveness of air defence depends not only on the missile but also on how quickly the entire system can detect and engage a target.

Practical Reasons for the Purchase

Greece still operates Russian-made Tor-M1 and Osa-AK systems, but their maintenance has become increasingly difficult since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Key challenges include:

• Limited access to spare parts
• Effectively ended cooperation with Moscow
• Ageing existing systems

Athens therefore had to make a decision and chose Israeli solutions.

From PULS to the Achilles Shield

The new programme should be viewed together with the agreement signed in April for the acquisition of the PULS rocket artillery system. That contract, worth approximately €656 million, includes:

• Precision-guided missiles
• Loitering munitions

Some of the launchers are expected to be deployed on Greek islands in the Aegean, which Türkiye has for years demanded should be demilitarised.

PULS gives Greece a stronger long-range strike capability, while the Achilles Shield is intended to provide the defensive layer. Athens wants to intercept incoming drones and missiles, but also retain the ability to strike launchers, command posts, and logistical facilities at greater distances.

Structural Cooperation with Israel

This is no longer the purchase of separate platforms. Greece is building a system, and cooperation with Israel is therefore structural, not transactional. The two countries are deepening military ties through:

• Joint exercises
• Industrial programmes
• Training of Greek pilots at Kalamata (with Israeli involvement)

Additionally, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel are discussing the establishment of a rapid-reaction unit intended to protect sensitive infrastructure, including offshore gas installations.

Advantages and Risks

Israeli systems are attractive to Athens because they:

• Have been tested in combat
• Can probably be delivered more quickly
• May be cheaper than some European alternatives

However, reliance on Israel also creates dependence on foreign technology, ammunition, and technical support. This must be taken into account, particularly at a time when Israeli industry is already under pressure from growing demand and continuing military operations.

Türkiye Remains Part of the Calculation

Greece officially argues that its cooperation with Israel is not directed against any third country. However, Türkiye remains an obvious element of the calculation. Key factors include:

• Ankara is rapidly expanding its missile, drone, and defence-industrial capabilities
• Disputes over maritime boundaries, Cyprus, and the militarisation of Greek islands have not disappeared

The rapprochement between Greece and Israel accelerated after the 2019 agreement between Türkiye and Libya, which Athens regarded as a direct challenge to Greek interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since then, cooperation with Israel has increasingly become part of the Greek response to the growth of Turkish military power.

Broader Context and Risks

This does not mean that every Greek acquisition should be interpreted only through rivalry with Ankara. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated that European states need stronger protection against drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic threats.

Nevertheless, in the Greek case, the development of Turkish capabilities clearly accelerates decisions that might otherwise have taken much longer.

There is also a risk of a regional arms race. A stronger Greek air-defence shield may increase deterrence, but it may also encourage Türkiye to develop new systems intended to penetrate it. Ankara is already investing heavily in:

• Ballistic missiles
• Unmanned aircraft
• Long-range precision weapons

One side’s defensive modernisation can therefore become the justification for the other side’s offensive expansion.