UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy fails to reach consensus for first time in 20 years

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Publication date: 2026-07-27 13:22:58

UN Counterterrorism Review Collapses, Raising Questions About Future Role

For the first time in its 20-year history, the United Nations General Assembly failed to reach consensus on the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). The ninth review of the GCTS, which concluded in early July, also marked the second consecutive review cycle in which the General Assembly failed to implement much-needed updates to the strategy. The last substantial revision to the text occurred in 2021.

These successive failures will amplify questions about the role of the U.N.’s counterterrorism entities and programs, particularly as the organization faces dramatic resource constraints. With a major leadership change approaching in 2027—as the General Assembly selects a new Secretary-General later this year—it will be high time to explore alternative ways to right-size the U.N.’s counterterrorism system and ensure it is fit for purpose.

A Late Start, Quickly Unraveled

As 2026 marked the GCTS’s 20th anniversary, many states entered the review seeking a more substantial update and showed early willingness to negotiate on issues such as new technology and oversight of U.N. counterterrorism programming. However, the process struggled from the outset.

• The two co-facilitators—Ambassador Elina Kalkku of Finland and Ambassador Omar Hilale of Morocco—were appointed months later than in past reviews, compressing an already difficult timeline.
• Once talks began in April, they quickly expanded. States proposed edits to nearly all of the strategy’s 180 paragraphs and suggested 30 new ones on a broad range of issues, from border security and transnational organized crime to hate speech and gaming, with few areas of agreement.
• States staked out conflicting nonnegotiable positions (“red lines”), and discussions became heated at many points.
• The United States circulated alternative texts that challenged the process and ultimately torpedoed any progressive outcome.

The co-facilitators attempted to rein in the process by reducing the number of issues on the table, but by then it was too late for broad agreement on even a select few.

In the end, frustrated by the lack of compromise, the co-facilitators put forward a resolution identical to the previous review (save for the removal of two paragraphs on COVID-19). After proposing and subsequently withdrawing a last-minute amendment calling for significant procedural changes to future reviews, the United States broke consensus practice by calling for a vote. It was joined by Israel and Argentina in opposing the resolution.

The months of back-and-forth negotiations signaled a general appetite to update the strategy, but that appetite collided with a multilateral environment too polarized and a process too rushed to deliver results.

Factors in Failure

Several factors contributed to the outcome of the review, beginning with the process itself and the late appointment of the co-facilitators.

• In past reviews, the president of the General Assembly named co-facilitators in October of the year preceding the March start of negotiations. This time, the appointment came only at the end of January.
• This reduced the time the co-facilitators had to meet with all delegations, gauge priorities, and identify a handful of issues where broad consensus was possible.
• The delayed appointment may also reflect the unwillingness of many states to take on the role in a challenging negotiating environment, rather than any lack of effort by the General Assembly president.

Even with limited time, the co-facilitators’ tactics did not appear to meet the moment, and their approach to the negotiations precipitated the outcome in many ways. In an increasingly fraught multilateral environment, making progress on the GCTS required significant, early, and sustained diplomacy with key states and negotiating blocs, combined with a deliberate strategy to build incremental agreement on select issues and paragraphs. In the absence of such an approach, the negotiations became too unwieldy to manage in the shortened timeframe.

Another contributing factor was the U.S. approach in the negotiations, which was notably different from its disengagement from and blatant opposition to other U.N. negotiations. In this case, the United States appears to see the U.N. as useful.