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PoliticsUN fails to reach consensus on Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review for first time in 20 years
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The United Nations General Assembly failed to reach consensus on the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) for the first time in its 20-year history during the ninth review concluded in early July 2026. The review, which marked the second consecutive cycle without substantial updates, was hampered by a late appointment of co-facilitators, a polarized multilateral environment, and conflicting red lines among member states. The United States broke with consensus practice by calling for a vote, joined only by Israel and Argentina in opposing the resolution. The failure raises questions about the role of U.N. counterterrorism entities amid resource constraints and upcoming leadership changes, including the selection of a new Secretary-General in 2027. The article explores factors behind the failure and suggests alternative paths for structural reform.
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Publication date: 2026-07-27 13:22:58
UN Counterterrorism Review Collapses Amid Polarization and Process Failures
For the first time in its 20-year history, the United Nations General Assembly failed to reach consensus on the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). The ninth review of the GCTS, which concluded in early July, also marked the second consecutive review cycle in which the General Assembly failed to make much-needed updates to the strategy. The last substantial revision to the text occurred in 2021.
These successive failures will amplify questions about the role of the U.N.’s counterterrorism entities and programs at a time when the organization is facing dramatic resource constraints. With a major leadership change approaching in 2027—as the General Assembly selects a new Secretary-General later this year—it will be high time to explore alternative ways to right-size the U.N.’s counterterrorism system and ensure it is fit for purpose.
A Late Start, Quickly Unraveled
With 2026 marking the GCTS’s 20th anniversary, many states entered the review seeking a more substantial update and showed early willingness to negotiate on issues such as new technology and oversight of U.N. counterterrorism programming. However, the process struggled from the outset.
- Delayed appointments: The two co-facilitators—Ambassador Elina Kalkku of Finland and Ambassador Omar Hilale of Morocco—were appointed months later than in past reviews, compressing an already difficult timeline.
- Overwhelming scope: Once talks began in April, they quickly sprawled. States proposed edits to nearly all of the strategy’s 180 paragraphs and suggested 30 new ones on a broad range of issues, from border security and transnational organized crime to hate speech and gaming, with few areas of agreement.
- Entrenched positions: States staked out conflicting nonnegotiable positions (“red lines”), and discussions became heated at many points.
- U.S. intervention: The United States circulated alternative texts that challenged the process and ultimately torpedoed any progressive outcome.
The co-facilitators attempted to rein in the process by reducing the number of issues on the table, but by that point, it was too late for broad agreement on even a select few.
In the end, frustrated by the lack of compromise, the co-facilitators put forward a resolution identical to the previous review—save for the removal of two paragraphs on COVID-19. After proposing and subsequently withdrawing a last-minute amendment calling for significant procedural changes to future reviews, the United States broke consensus practice by calling for a vote. It was joined by Israel and Argentina in opposing the resolution.
The months of back-and-forth negotiations signaled a general appetite to update the strategy, but that appetite collided with a multilateral environment too polarized and a process too rushed to deliver results.
Factors in Failure
Several factors contributed to the outcome of the review.
Process and Timing
The late appointment of the co-facilitators was a key issue. In past reviews, the president of the General Assembly named them in October of the year preceding the March start of negotiations. This time, the appointment came only at the end of January. This reduced the time the co-facilitators had to meet with all delegations, gauge priorities, and identify a handful of issues where broad consensus was possible. The delayed appointment may also reflect the unwillingness of many states to take on the role in a challenging negotiating environment, rather than any lack of effort by the General Assembly president.
Tactical Missteps
Even with limited time, the co-facilitators’ tactics did not appear to meet the moment. In an increasingly fraught multilateral environment, making progress on the GCTS required significant, early, and sustained diplomacy with key states and negotiating blocs, combined with a deliberate strategy to build incremental agreement on select issues and paragraphs. In the absence of such an approach, the negotiations became too unwieldy to manage in the shortened timeframe.
U.S. Approach
The U.S. approach in the negotiations was notably different from its disengagement from and blatant opposition to other U.N. negotiations. In this case, the United States appears to see the U.N. as useful.
Source
Just SecurityNeutral / independent
Part of this Story
After a Failed U.N. Counterterrorism Strategy Review, What Other Paths to Structural Reform?