Review: America’s Afghanistan Delusion and the Myth of a Winnable War
This article reviews Paul D. Miller’s book, Choosing Defeat, which argues that the US war in Afghanistan was strategically winnable but lost due to major errors by successive presidents. Tom Stevenson critiques Miller’s attempt to rehabilitate the war’s reputation, noting that while Miller views it as a just war of self-defense marred by poor execution, the reality involved a complacent empire enacting a bloody occupation. The review highlights that the chaotic NATO withdrawal in August 2021 is seen by many insiders as a betrayal of both Afghanistan and American global power. Although the political establishment now treats the conflict as a cautionary tale, it is not yet widely acknowledged as a crime. Stevenson challenges Miller’s narrative by pointing out omitted contexts, such as the incipient famine in Afghanistan during the 2001 bombing campaign, which exacerbated humanitarian crises. The piece underscores the disconnect between the strategic intentions of US officials and the devastating human cost, including at least 175,000 deaths, ultimately framing the twenty-year saga as a failure of imperial overreach rather than a missed opportunity for victory.
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Review: America’s Afghanistan Delusion and the Myth of a Winnable War
This article reviews Paul D. Miller’s book, Choosing Defeat, which argues that the US war in Afghanistan was strategically winnable but lost due to major errors by successive presidents. Tom Stevenson critiques Miller’s attempt to rehabilitate the war’s reputation, noting that while Miller views it as a just war of self-defense marred by poor execution, the reality involved a complacent empire enacting a bloody occupation. The review highlights that the chaotic NATO withdrawal in August 2021 is seen by many insiders as a betrayal of both Afghanistan and American global power. Although the political establishment now treats the conflict as a cautionary tale, it is not yet widely acknowledged as a crime. Stevenson challenges Miller’s narrative by pointing out omitted contexts, such as the incipient famine in Afghanistan during the 2001 bombing campaign, which exacerbated humanitarian crises. The piece underscores the disconnect between the strategic intentions of US officials and the devastating human cost, including at least 175,000 deaths, ultimately framing the twenty-year saga as a failure of imperial overreach rather than a missed opportunity for victory.