CSC Financial Fund manager Zhou Ziguang sees AUM shrink 80% in four years, flagship fund NAV falls to 0.38 yuan
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This article from NetEase Finance analyzes the decline of Zhou Ziguang, a fund manager at China Securities Co., Ltd. (CSC) Fund, once hailed as the 'New Energy King.' In 2022, Zhou managed 3.5 billion yuan and his products ranked in the top 10% of the market. Four years later, his assets under management have shrunk by 80% to 731 million yuan, with his flagship fund, Zhixiang Shenghuo A, posting a net value of 0.38 yuan, a cumulative loss of over 62%. The article attributes his downfall to three mistimed investment shifts: holding onto the new energy sector after its peak in 2021, pivoting to the low-altitude economy theme in early 2025 instead of the AI-driven tech bull market, and then moving into commercial aerospace in mid-2026, which also underperformed. It further notes that CSC Fund relies heavily on fixed-income products (82% of its 103.6 billion yuan AUM), with equity funds making up less than 7%, and that the company's profits have risen despite equity losses. The article advises retail investors to scrutinize a fund company's equity proportion, a manager's track record beyond peak returns, and actual net losses versus management fees.
Source report
"Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked." — Warren Buffett
This quote applies perfectly to Zhou Ziguang, a fund manager at CSC Financial Fund.
In 2022, he was widely recognized as the "New Energy King," managing assets of 3.5 billion yuan, with his products ranking in the top 10% of the entire market. Four years later, the funds under his management have shrunk to just 731 million yuan—an 80% decline. His flagship fund now has a net value of 0.38 yuan, earning it the label of a "three-mao fund."
The tide has receded completely. Only now can investors see how much of that once-legendary story was genuine skill and how much was sheer luck.
The "Three-Mao Fund"
Zhou Ziguang currently manages three funds:
- CSC Zhixiang Shenghuo A: Net value of 0.38 yuan
- CSC Zhixiang Shenghuo C: Net value of 0.3753 yuan
This fund, established over five years ago, now languishes at just over 0.3 yuan. Since inception, cumulative losses exceed 62%. This year alone, it has fallen approximately 38%, ranking 4,993rd out of 5,003 similar funds. Its scale has shrunk from 400 million yuan to less than 50 million yuan, hovering near the liquidation threshold.
In simple terms: for every 1 yuan invested at launch, investors can now only get back 0.38 yuan.
Yet just four years ago, Zhou Ziguang was a hot commodity. In 2022, his management scale reached 3.5 billion yuan. During his tenure, Zhixiang Shenghuo achieved a maximum return of 55.44%, ranking in the top 10% of the market. His CSC Dicheng Chengzhang A fund posted a 10.89% annual return that year, ranking 8th out of 2,489 similar funds.
He had simultaneously ridden two of the hottest tracks—new energy and technology. That was his moment of glory, and also the starting point of his steepest decline.
Background: A Solid Start
Zhou Ziguang graduated with a master's degree in engineering from Dalian University of Technology in 2009. He then spent nearly seven years as a sell-side analyst covering power equipment and new energy at Jianghai Securities, Ping An Securities, and Founder Securities. In March 2016, he joined CSC Financial Fund, where he now serves as Head of the Research Department, member of the Investment Decision Committee, and fund manager.
With a professional background and a well-matched sector focus, his starting point was indeed impeccable.
His company positioned him as a "specialist in emerging track growth," combining "trend investing with value investing" and focusing on "new energy and technology tracks."
Three Missed Opportunities
Zhou Ziguang's problem is not a lack of ability—it's that he is always half a beat too late.
Over the past four years, he has misjudged the market three times, each more painful than the last.
First Mistake: Clinging to an Old Track
In the second half of 2021, new energy peaked. Smart money began to exit. Zhou Ziguang did not.
Zhixiang Shenghuo maintained heavy positions in power equipment and new energy. At the end of 2021, this sector accounted for 44.02% of the fund—nearly half of an actively managed equity fund was bet on a sector that had already peaked.
He held on for over three years. It wasn't until the second quarter of 2025 that the allocation dropped to 10.11%. The new energy elevator had long passed its upward journey. He got in while it was still rising, but when it turned downward, he stayed on board.
Second Mistake: Jumping into the Wrong Pool
In the first quarter of 2025, Zhixiang Shenghuo's top ten holdings were almost entirely replaced with low-altitude economy stocks, including Yingbo'er, Zongshen Power, and Sichuan Jiuzhou.
But the real theme that year was the technology bull market, with AI driving computing power and semiconductors higher. Low-altitude economy was merely a sporadic, short-lived theme.
The train he boarded was not the main line—it was the last car, and by the time he got on, the theme was already cooling.
Third Mistake: Trapped Again
In the second quarter of 2026, he reduced his low-altitude economy positions and shifted into commercial aerospace, buying stocks like Xibu Cailiao, Hangtian Gongcheng, Chaojie Gufen, and Hangtian Dianzi. In other words, he sold the AI power stocks that had been performing well and bought commercial aerospace and lithium battery stocks.
Commercial aerospace failed to take off, and another batch of positions became trapped.
Fund investors were furious:
- "Is this person shorting the market?"
- "Losses for years, no bottom in sight."
- "This quarter he actually went to catch the falling knife in commercial aerospace..."
Chasing the last train, becoming the exit liquidity—over four years, 3.5 billion yuan has shrunk to just 700 million.
The Trap of "Heavy Fixed Income, Light Equity"
CSC Financial Fund was established on September 9, 2013. As of the end of the second quarter of 2026, its total assets under management stood at 103.575 billion yuan.
Within this trillion-yuan-plus portfolio:
| Asset Type | Scale (billion yuan) | Percentage | |------------|---------------------|------------| | Money Market Funds | 53.615 | 51.8% | | Bonds | 31.384 | 30.3% | | Mixed Funds | 6.024 | 5.8% | | Equity Funds | 0.681 | 0.7% |
Equity products combined account for less than 7% of total AUM, hitting a new low since mid-2023.
In essence, this is a company propped up by money market and bond funds. Equity is barely enough to serve as a storefront.
- Fixed income is the rent-collecting building—stable income regardless of market conditions.
- Equity is the flashy storefront—if it loses money, the core business remains unscathed.
The company doesn't rely on equity for profits anyway. In 2025, revenue was 373 million yuan with a net profit of 70 million. In the first half of 2026, revenue was 244 million yuan with a net profit of 57 million—up 50% year-on-year.
While fund investors curse their losses in equity funds, the company collects steady rent from fixed income, with profits hitting new highs.
Management Turmoil
CSC Financial Fund has recently experienced significant personnel turnover:
- From March 23 to April 1, 2026, seven key employees left in just ten days, covering equity research, quantitative analysis, media/internet, investment banking coordination, and sales.
- By the end of August, approximately 22 people had their practitioner qualifications cancelled.
On April 23, Chairman Huang Ling left due to work arrangements, transferring to become Director of the Wealth Management Committee at CSC Securities. General Manager Jin Qiang succeeded him as Chairman, acting as General Manager for a period not exceeding six months.
Jin Qiang comes from a brokerage background—a sales-oriented executive with strong distribution DNA but weak investment research DNA.
When a fund company's helm is taken over by a veteran salesman, the direction is written on the wall.
Currently, the company's only standout products are 4 REITs, with a scale of 11.5 billion yuan, up 26% from the beginning of the year.
CSC Financial Fund's DNA of prioritizing fixed income over equity means the equity team operates at the margins of internal resource allocation.
How to Avoid the Next "Three-Mao Fund"
For ordinary fund investors, here are three things to check before investing:
1. Check the Company
Don't just look at total AUM. Ask what percentage is equity. A 100-billion-yuan fund company propped up by fixed income has nothing to do with the stock fund in your portfolio.
2. Check the Manager
Don't be fooled by historical peak returns. Those are often the result of riding the right elevator for one year—mistaking the elevator's speed for your own leg strength.
3. Check the Fund
Don't be misled by "long-term holding" rhetoric. First calculate how much in management fees has been collected over the years versus how much you've actually lost. The house always takes its cut—and it always outlives you.
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Source
网易财经Eastern
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Former 'New Energy King' Fund Manager Zhou Ziguang's Assets Shrink 80% as Net Value Plunges to 0.38 Yuan