CITIC-Prudential Fund manager Zhou Ziguang sees AUM shrink 80% in four years, flagship fund NAV falls to 0.38 yuan

"Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked." — Warren Buffett

This quote applies perfectly to Zhou Ziguang, a fund manager at China Securities Co., Ltd. (CSC) Fund.

In 2022, he was widely recognized as the "King of New Energy," managing assets of 3.5 billion RMB. His flagship fund ranked in the top 10% of the entire market. Four years later, his total AUM has shrunk to just 731 million RMB—a decline of 80%. His representative fund's net asset value (NAV) now stands at 0.38 RMB, earning it the label of a "three-mao fund."

The tide has receded completely. Only now can investors see how much of that once-celebrated story was genuine skill and how much was sheer luck.

The "Three-Mao Fund"

Zhou currently manages three funds:

• CSC Zhixiang Shenghuo A: NAV of 0.38 RMB
• CSC Zhixiang Shenghuo C: NAV of 0.3753 RMB

This fund, established over five years ago, has a NAV languishing around 0.3 RMB. Since inception, cumulative losses exceed 62%. This year alone, it has fallen approximately 38%, ranking 4,993rd out of 5,003 comparable funds. Its scale has dropped from 400 million RMB to less than 50 million RMB, hovering near the liquidation threshold.

In simple terms: for every 1 RMB invested at launch, investors can now recover only 0.38 RMB.

Yet just four years ago, Zhou was a hot commodity. In 2022, his AUM peaked at 3.5 billion RMB. During his tenure, Zhixiang Shenghuo achieved a maximum return of 55.44%, placing it in the top 10% of all funds. His other fund, CSC Ditan Chengzhang A, posted a 10.89% annual return, ranking 8th out of 2,489 comparable funds.

He had simultaneously ridden two of the hottest tracks—new energy and technology. That was his moment of glory, and also the starting point of his steepest decline.

Background: A Solid Start

Zhou Ziguang earned a Master's degree in Engineering from Dalian University of Technology in 2009. He then spent nearly seven years as a sell-side analyst covering power equipment and new energy at Jianghai Securities, Ping An Securities, and Founder Securities. He joined CSC Fund in March 2016 and now holds the titles of Head of the Research Department, member of the Investment Decision Committee, and fund manager.

With a professional background and a well-aligned sector focus, his starting point was indeed impeccable.

His firm positioned him as a "specialist in emerging growth tracks," combining "trend investing with value investing."

Three Missed Opportunities

Zhou's problem is not a lack of ability—it's that he is perpetually one step behind.

Over the past four years, he has misjudged the market three times, each more painful than the last.

First Mistake: Clinging to an Old Track

In the second half of 2021, new energy peaked. Smart money began to exit. Zhou did not.

Zhixiang Shenghuo maintained a heavy allocation to power equipment and new energy. At the end of 2021, this sector accounted for 44.02% of the fund—nearly half of an actively managed equity fund was bet on a sector that had already peaked.

He held this position for over three years. Only by Q2 2025 did the allocation drop to 10.11%. The new energy elevator had long passed its upward journey. Zhou got in while it was still rising, but when it turned downward, he failed to get off.

Second Mistake: Jumping into the Wrong Theme

In Q1 2025, Zhixiang Shenghuo's top ten holdings were almost entirely replaced with low-altitude economy stocks, such as Enpower Electric, Zongshen Power, and Sichuan Jiuzhou Electric.

However, the true market theme that year was the tech bull market, led by AI, computing power, and semiconductors. Low-altitude economy was merely an occasional, fleeting theme.

The train he boarded was not the main line—it was the last car, and by the time he got on, the theme was already cooling.

Third Mistake: Trapped Again

In Q2 2026, he reduced his low-altitude economy positions and rotated into commercial aerospace stocks, including Western Superconducting, China Aerospace Engineering, Suzhou Chunxing Precision Mechanical, and China Aerospace Times Electronics.

In other words, he sold the AI power stocks that had performed well earlier in the year to buy commercial aerospace and lithium battery stocks.

Commercial aerospace failed to take off, and a new batch of capital was trapped.

Investors were furious:

• "Is this guy shorting the market?"
• "Losses for years, no bottom in sight."
• "This quarter he actually went to catch the falling knife in commercial aerospace..."

Chasing the last train, becoming the exit liquidity—over four years, 3.5 billion RMB shrank to just 700 million.

The "Fixed Income Heavy, Equity Light" Dilemma

CSC Fund was established on September 9, 2013. As of Q2 2026, its total AUM stood at 103.575 billion RMB.

Within this trillion-scale portfolio:

• Money market funds: 53.615 billion RMB (51.8%)
• Bond funds: 31.384 billion RMB (30.3%)
• Hybrid funds: 6.024 billion RMB
• Equity funds: 681 million RMB

Equity products together account for less than 7% of total AUM, hitting a new low since mid-2023.

In essence, this is a company propped up by money market and bond funds. Equity is barely a facade.

• Fixed income is the steady rental income—reliable regardless of market conditions.
• Equity is the flashy storefront—if it fails, the core business remains unscathed.

The firm does not rely on equity for profits. In 2025, revenue was 373 million RMB with net profit of 70 million RMB. In the first half of 2026, revenue was 244 million RMB with net profit of 57 million RMB, up 50% year-on-year.

While retail investors lose money in equity funds, the company collects steady fees from fixed income, posting record profits.

Management Turmoil

CSC Fund has recently experienced significant personnel turnover:

• From March 23 to April 1, 2026, seven key employees resigned within ten days, covering equity research, quantitative analysis, internet/media, investment banking coordination, and sales.
• By the end of August, approximately 22 people had their practitioner qualifications cancelled.

On April 23, Chairman Huang Ling stepped down due to work arrangements, transferring to the Wealth Management Committee of CSC Securities. General Manager Jin Qiang succeeded him as Chairman, acting as GM for a period not exceeding six months.

Jin Qiang comes from a brokerage background—a sales-oriented executive with strong distribution DNA but weak investment research DNA.

When a fund management company's leader is replaced by a veteran salesman, the strategic direction is clear.

Currently, the firm's only standout product is its four REITs, with a combined scale of 11.5 billion RMB, up 26% from the beginning of the year.

CSC Fund's fixed-income-heavy, equity-light DNA ensures that the equity team remains marginalized in internal resource allocation.

How to Avoid the Next "Three-Mao Fund"

For ordinary retail investors, here are three key checks before investing:

1. Check the Company

Don't just look at total AUM. Ask: What percentage is equity? A trillion RMB propped up by fixed income has nothing to do with the stock fund you're holding.

2. Check the Manager

Don't be fooled by historical peak returns. That was likely a year when they caught the right elevator—mistaking the elevator's speed for their own leg strength.

3. Check the Fund

Don't be misled by "long-term holding" rhetoric. First calculate: How much in management fees have they collected, and how much have you actually lost? The house always takes its cut, and it will outlive you.

Disclaimer: The above content (including images and videos) is uploaded and published by a user of the NetEase Hao self-media platform. This platform provides only information storage services.