Fresh snack stores hit 4M yuan monthly sales, but missing ingredient lists spark trust crisis

By Yana | September 19

The first national store of [formerly Xueji Roasted Goods] opened on B1 floor of Beijing Chaoyang Hopson One on September 19. Together with [brands], the B1 level now hosts four fresh snack brands.

Beijing Chaoyang Hopson One's B1 floor is just a microcosm of the industry. Since the beginning of this year, fresh snacks have been replacing trendy bakeries and bubble tea shops, entering major commercial hubs in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, becoming the new "queues of choice."

Shanghai Wujiaochang Hopson One also opened a first store for Dakoushou; major commercial hubs in Shenzhen have become the first stop for brands like [brands], Yili, and Jiduoquan expanding southward.

These snack shops emphasize short shelf life, fresh baking, fresh braising, and minimal additives. Some are even called "affordable Sam's Club." Native brands have already validated the fresh snack business model: Jinlimen averages monthly sales of 1.5 million yuan per store, with top stores reaching 4 million yuan; with the first-store effect, Yili's Hopson One store exceeded 6.2 million yuan in its first month, and Jiduoquan's first Hefei store surpassed 6 million yuan.

According to an incomplete tally by ChopSpicy, there are now over 40 brands in this sector, broadly divided into two camps: native brands and new ventures from major retail and bubble tea brands. Product categories have also expanded from early roasted goods, tea drinks, and pastries to duck products and braised items.

2026: The Year of Large-Scale Expansion

In 2026, the fresh snack sector collectively launched large-scale expansion. One of the leading players, "Jiduoquan," has fully opened franchising. Public information shows it plans to add 600–1,000 new stores in 2026. "Pumama" plans to open 200 new stores, focusing on East China. Jinlimen and Yili are gradually expanding from regional to national presence. According to media reports, Jinlimen, Jiduoquan, and Yili are all in talks for Series A funding, with valuations ranging from 2 to 3 billion yuan, and top institutions like Sequoia are paying attention.

While native brands are racing to expand, snack and tea beverage brands are also entering the fray: [brand] launched "You·Tuijian," Juewei Food launched "Juewei Fresh Snacks," and Chayan Yuese tested the waters with "Chayan Jishi Shangwei."

Intense Competition and Growing Homogeneity

However, amid fierce competition, products are becoming increasingly similar, and even logos are highly identical. For example, Qingshansen's green logo resembles Yili's, while Dakoushou's red-and-blue color scheme is nearly identical to Jinlimen's.

After nearly a year of rapid growth, the industry is facing a crisis of trust. The hottest topics are no longer store opening speeds and funding scales but several glaring controversies: false short shelf life, deceptive "fresh baking," and quality control failures.

The Missing Ingredient List

Walk into any fresh snack store, and you'll likely find no ingredient list.

Bulk roasted goods and fried items are the most common offenders. These bulk snacks usually have production dates, shelf life, and ingredient lists posted on shelves but not on the packaging.

"Although they claim 'zero preservatives,' there's no ingredient list on the packaging. I still take a second look at the test report posted on the shelf before buying," one consumer complained on social media.

At Jiduoquan stores, the slogan "No need to check the ingredient list" is even written on the wall as a badge of honor. On the official mini-programs of Jinlimen and Yili, product detail pages also lack key information. Most products only show name,规格, and price; ingredient lists, production dates, and shelf life are all missing.

But the law is clear. According to Article 67 of the Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, pre-packaged food must have labels indicating ingredients or ingredient lists. The National Food Safety Standard for Pre-packaged Food Labeling (GB 7718-2025) , released in 2025, further detailed labeling requirements.

This means that many pre-packaged products in fresh snack stores are, strictly speaking, pre-packaged foods. Not labeling ingredient lists puts them on the edge of legal compliance.

The industry's tacit acceptance of this practice hinges on the word "fresh-made." Fresh snack stores classify many products as "fresh-made and sold-on-site," and the labeling management for fresh-made food does have a gray area.

For brands, this gray area offers convenience, but it's not a long-term solution. The recent case of Juewei Fresh Snacks is a typical example. According to reports from "Business That Little Thing" citing Retail Business Finance, the fresh drink preparation area at the entrance of Juewei Fresh Snack stores advertised a shelf life of only one day, but the drink base was actually a long-shelf-life concentrated fruit pulp, simply mixed and relabeled as a short-shelf-life product.

Not only Juewei Fresh Snacks, but also Jinlimen and Jiduoquan's fresh-made beverages have been exposed for not disclosing ingredient lists, leaving consumers in the dark about product components.

This recalls the lesson of Moyogurt. In 2024, Moyogurt was called out by the Shanghai Consumer Council for discrepancies between product ingredients and marketing claims. Tests found that its mango yogurt smoothie had 3.25 times more fat than protein. It was later exposed for using ingredients expired for over 40 days and changing expiration labels. After the public outcry, the tea beverage industry generally began providing detailed calorie, caffeine, and ingredient labels. But the fresh snack industry seems not to have learned from this lesson, with ingredient lists still collectively hidden.

The Contradiction Between "Fresh" and Scale

The appeal of fresh snacks lies in the freshness and quality of "fresh-made and sold-on-site," but the brand's commercial goal is rapid replication, scale expansion, and cost reduction. These two are inherently in conflict.

When consumers walk into a fresh snack store, see on-site baking, and smell the aroma, they subconsciously assume the products are fresh, additive-free, short-shelf-life, and healthy, and are thus willing to pay a premium for "freshness."

But the brand's actual operation follows a different logic. To achieve scale, they must establish central factories, cold chain logistics, and standardized formula systems. However, amid rapid industry expansion, many new brands' supply chains and quality control are still immature. When stores expand from dozens to hundreds, the promise of "daily fresh delivery" is easily compromised in logistics and inventory.

In reality, long-shelf-life products dominate the product mix of most fresh snack brands. Besides fresh-baked and fresh-made items, stores generally have a large number of pre-packaged products. Many so-called "fresh-made" products are actually pre-packaged foods delivered from central factories, with only the final heating or repackaging step done in-store.

To enhance brand trust and reinforce the "fresh-made" perception, many stores set up open kitchens to bake chestnuts and pastries on-site. Yili, which started with roasted chestnuts, is a typical example.

At Yili stores, about 30% of SKUs are medium-to-long-shelf-life products, while fresh-baked items have a shelf life of only 3 days. According to Huachuang Securities, Jinlimen's short-shelf-life products (1–5 days) account for 46.1% of SKUs and are estimated to contribute over 60% of sales; Pumama's share is close to 40%; Jiduoquan's is about 45%. This means that over half of the fresh snack shelves still rely on long-shelf-life products to hedge inventory risk.

This mix of short- and long-shelf-life products also confuses consumers. According to consumer feedback, Jiduoquan even grades snacks from A to F based on ingredient list cleanliness. But consumers are more concerned: Is this pack of duck wings labeled "shelf life 5 days" really only good for 5 days, or can it last six months but is only labeled as 5 days?

Safety Concerns and False Short Shelf Life

More alarming are safety concerns. Earlier this year, Jinlimen was exposed for claiming its "lemon spicy boneless chicken feet" were made in its own factory and delivered daily, but they were actually purchased as semi-finished products and repackaged, with even allegations of tampering with labels.

Labeling a long-shelf-life product as short-shelf-life is not illegal—this is the gray area. Chinese regulations do not mandate specific shelf life lengths for food products; shelf life is determined by the company itself. As long as the product meets quality standards within the labeled shelf life, it is not legally problematic. But in terms of business ethics, it's a completely different matter.

When short shelf life becomes a marketing gimmick, the premium logic of fresh snacks is eroding the entire industry's credibility.

Pricing Strategy: Low Entry, High Check

Fresh snacks attract young people partly because of their trendy store designs—industrial style, fresh-baked aesthetics—which are inherently Instagrammable and serve as a draw.

Another factor is a shrewd pricing strategy: individual items are priced low, but the overall average ticket is high.

ChopSpicy visited a Yili store at Beijing Hopson One on a weekday. The store was crowded, with several chefs in the open kitchen baking bread crisps, filling the air with aroma.

At the entrance, staff used 9.9 yuan per bottle or 19.9 yuan for two bottles of fresh-made tea to lure passersby, and 8.9 yuan for two chestnut cones. This low-price temptation, combined with the store's ambiance, creates an illusion of cheap and fresh for young shoppers.

But many find after entering that the low prices are just a facade. For example, Yili's fresh-baked sea salt taro sticks cost 60.8 yuan per 500g—a small bag easily costs 20–30 yuan, and 6–7 fresh-baked sweet potato sticks cost over 20 yuan.

In contrast, the newly opened Dakoushou and Qingshansen at Hopson One have less of this "smoke and fire" feel; they resemble warehouse-style supermarkets. Both stores use customized packaging and display items in refrigerated cabinets, shelves, and pallets. Many consumers remark that shopping at these fresh snack stores increasingly feels like visiting an "affordable Sam's Club."

Dakoushou, from Guangdong and about 300 square meters, mostly sells packaged standard products, with only the grilled fish fillet series being fresh-baked and having a 7-day shelf life. One netizen said they spent 110 yuan on five boxes of snacks and two bottles of water.

"Fresh-baked" and "short shelf life" are the real reasons for the premium. Compared to Yili's open-kitchen freshness, Qingshansen has more packaged standard products and thus relatively lower prices. Qingshansen, from Henan, has more SKUs, including not only roasted goods and refrigerated pastries but also a large display of freshly made spicy braised items.

Compared to traditional bulk snack stores with an average ticket of 28–35 yuan, fresh snack stores generally have an average ticket of 40–60 yuan, 1.5 to 2 times higher.

On social media, complaints about exorbitant bills are common. One consumer said bluntly: "I went twice and felt the products were highly homogeneous. They tell stories to emphasize freshness, but the actual experience wasn't impressive." Another consumer compared prices and found that a certain braised tendon meat cost 66 yuan per kg at a supermarket but 79.6 yuan per kg at a snack store, a premium of over 20%.

To justify the high premium, brands like to emphasize the rarity of raw materials and the exclusivity of their processes. For example, melon seeds from Keketuohai in Xinjiang, chestnuts from the Yanshan Mountains, and "flash-frozen at minus 38 degrees." But these so-called differentiators are not unique. Brands like Baicaowei, [brand], and Lishanghuang also use chestnuts from the Yanshan Mountains. Not only can the origin be shared, but the process descriptions are also easily imitated.

The real cost of fresh snacks is not the product itself, but the premium scene packaging. Opening a store in a mall's B1 floor costs much more in rent than a street-side shop, and this cost is ultimately passed on to every gram of snack sold. A significant portion of the "freshness premium" consumers pay is actually for mall rent and brand packaging.

Franchising: The Riskiest Signal

The most dangerous signal in the fresh snack industry is the collective opening of franchising before supply chains and quality control are mature.

Currently, leading fresh snack brands have developed a replicable single-store profit model in core commercial areas of first- and second-tier cities.

A typical store: located in a core commercial area of a first- or second-tier city, 200–300 square meters, average ticket 45–60 yuan, top stores monthly sales of 1.5–4 million yuan, gross margin 30%–35%, payback period under one year.

For comparison, among other retail categories with franchising models, traditional bulk snack chain "Mingming Henmang" has an average monthly GMV of about 350,000 yuan per store, gross margin 15%–20%, net profit margin about 8%, and payback period 2–3 years; tea beverage brands have an average monthly revenue of about 220,000 yuan per store, gross margin 55%, net profit margin 12.23%, and payback period about 13.4 months.

Although the fresh snack industry has yet to produce a national leader, a clear three-tier structure has emerged: native brands like Jinlimen, Jiduoquan, Pumama, and Yili nutco occupy regional markets with first-mover advantages; cross-border giants like "You·Tuijian" under Mingming Henmang and "Juewei Xianlu" under Juewei are poised to leverage their supply chains and financial strength; and cross-sector players like Chayan Yuese and Ningmeng Xiangyou, though smaller, are more agile.

The financial model of fresh snacks looks impressive, but its premise is extreme loss control. According to a research report by Orient Securities on fresh snacks, due to their short shelf life, the average loss rate is 8%–15%, significantly higher than the 1%–3% for supermarkets, convenience stores, and bulk snack stores. This means that compared to traditional snacks, fresh snack stores lose several times more profit annually. This is the key factor determining whether franchisees can survive.

Furthermore, it's important to clarify that fresh snacks are far more than just a supply chain business. If it were purely about supply chains, bulk giants like Three Squirrels and [brand] would have an advantage. Fresh snacks compete on short-shelf-life supply chains, in-store fresh-making, and hit-product operations.

From their origins and transformation paths, leading fresh snack players mainly come from two backgrounds: traditional roasted goods and upgraded bulk snacks.

Brands transitioning from traditional roasted goods have nuts and roasted items as their profit base, extending into baked goods, braised items, dried fruits, and fresh-made beverages. Their strengths are nut supply chains and long-shelf-life standard product cash flow; their weaknesses are depth in fresh food categories and experience in short-shelf-life operations. Brands upgraded from bulk snacks also lack experience in short-shelf-life supply chains.

Short-shelf-life supply chains are highly sensitive to delivery radius and store density: the shorter the radius and the denser the stores, the faster the turnover and the more controllable the loss. This is why regional brands found it easier to validate their models early on. Jinlimen in Changsha and Yili in Shenyang only verified single-store profitability after high-density store placement locally. But this also means that once they expand beyond their local markets, the delivery radius lengthens, store density decreases, and loss control becomes more difficult. Currently, new brands like Pumama, Qiaxiaoke, Lingtuantuan, Chaoren Lingshi, Xianboshi, and Jiushishan are expanding across regions. Whether they can maintain supply chain efficiency after cross-regional expansion remains unknown.

The most aggressively expanding brands currently use franchising models. The common industry path is: first open flagship stores in core commercial areas of first- and second-tier cities to validate the single-store model, then replicate in lower-tier markets. Lower-tier markets lack warehouse-style membership stores like Sam's Club, but through social media, consumers are already aware of Sam's hit products. Fresh snacks that benchmark these items are more likely to open the market.

However, lower-tier markets have lower store density and longer delivery radii, which naturally conflict with the density requirements of short-shelf-life supply chains. This is one of the biggest risks of the current franchising expansion model.

After validating the model through direct operation, franchising to scale up should be a normal business path. But if the supply chain and quality control are not yet mature, franchising becomes a risk transfer game.

Currently, Jinlimen, which insists on direct operation, can achieve monthly sales of up to 4 million yuan per store with a gross margin of 35%–40%, but its expansion is slow, with only 30 directly operated stores nationwide. In contrast, Jiduoquan, which relies on franchising, has already scaled to over 5 times that size, with more than 200 stores. Since opening franchising at the end of 2025, its 2026 target is 600–1,000 new stores. However, its franchising threshold is also high, requiring a deposit certificate of no less than 1.5 million yuan.

Besides Jiduoquan, [brand]'s incubated "Baipinhao" has opened franchising. Juewei Fresh Snacks, after completing internal pilots in Changsha and Chengdu, plans to officially expand nationwide in July 2026. Pumama is also considering a franchising model.

However, market optimism about the model does not mean franchisees will make money. An industry insider said that opening a fresh snack franchise store requires an initial investment of about 2–3 million yuan, with total actual investment (including inventory) of about 4 million yuan, or even over 10 million yuan. Combined with core commercial area rent and labor costs, many new stores find it difficult to break even in the short term.

One franchisee calculated: with a monthly revenue of 300,000 yuan, the net monthly profit is less than 20,000 yuan. Assuming an initial investment of about 1 million yuan, the payback period is as long as 4 years.

Although there are differences in investment across cities and store types, whether a fresh snack franchise store can make money mainly depends on foot traffic, loss rates, and headquarters policies. If the headquarters makes money by selling raw materials but leaves inventory losses, quality fluctuations, and food safety risks to franchisees, that's a case of "revenue upfront, risk deferred"—the most dangerous aspect of the franchising model.

At this stage, fresh snacks represent genuine consumer demand, but on the supply side, only the direct-operated flagship model of leading brands has been validated. A scalable, franchise-replicable profit model has not yet been proven. For franchisees, the uncertainty is far greater than the certainty in the sales pitch.

Conclusion

Every retail trend begins with a precise capture of consumer pain points and ends with a departure from business common sense. Fresh snacks are not a pseudo-demand, but before the "fresh" banner is exhausted, the industry needs a deep lesson in everything from supply chain to franchising ethics. Otherwise, the young people queuing up today will be queuing to leave tomorrow.