Federal judge denies pseudonymity for sex offender immigration detainee

In Alobid v. Marin, decided March 9, 2026, by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar (C.D. Cal.) and recently posted on Westlaw, the court denied an immigration detainee's motion to proceed under a pseudonym.

Background

The petitioner, a pro se immigration detainee, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a Motion for Leave to Proceed Under a Pseudonym.

Legal Standard

The court noted the general rule that "the identity of the parties in any action, civil or criminal, should not be concealed except in an unusual case, where there is a need for the cloak of anonymity." A party's use of a fictitious name "runs afoul of the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings, and [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 10(a)'s command that the title of every complaint 'include the names of all the parties.'"

However, the Ninth Circuit has "allowed the use of pseudonyms in exceptional cases where necessary 'to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.'" When a party requests "Doe" status, the factors to be balanced against the general presumption that parties' identities are public information are:

1. The severity of the threatened harm
2. The reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears
3. The anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation

The party seeking anonymity bears the burden of proving it should be allowed to proceed anonymously.

Court's Analysis

The petitioner sought to proceed anonymously because he is a convicted sex offender who believes he may face danger in Syria, his country of origin, if removed there.

The court found that the nature of the petitioner's criminal conviction alone was insufficient to warrant pseudonym use, citing U.S. v. Stoterau (9th Cir. 2008):

"If the nature of Stoterau's offense alone could qualify him for the use of a pseudonym, there would be no principled basis for denying pseudonymity to any defendant convicted of a similar sex offense. Such a significant broadening of the circumstances in which we have permitted pseudonymity is contrary to our long-established policy of upholding 'the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings,' and contrary to our requirement that pseudonymity be limited to the 'unusual case.'"

While the court acknowledged that "retaliation from a foreign government is recognized by the Ninth Circuit and other district courts as a sufficient basis to proceed anonymously," it concluded that the petitioner's "conclusory and unsupported assertion that he may face danger if removed to Syria is insufficient to meet his burden of establishing he should be allowed to proceed anonymously in this action."