Iranian regime falls before 2027?

Earlier updates

The chart shows each outcome’s published likelihood, including its baseline and news adjustment at that time.

1. Aug 25, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at a low 7.5%, as the newly discovered gas field is unlikely to ease the regime's systemic pressures in the near term.; Iran's announcement of a major gas discovery in Fars province stands out against a backdrop of energy shortages and external military strikes. However, the field is years away from full production and cannot immediately alleviate the quarter-cut in daily output caused by US-Israeli strikes and sanctions. Meanwhile, repairs at the critical South Pars field are only 70% complete, underscoring infrastructure fragility. On balance, this discovery does not alter the economic and security challenges facing the regime, leaving the stability assessment unchanged.
2. Aug 26, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at a low 7.5%, as the new US maximum pressure campaign intensifies external strain but has yet to shake the regime's foundations.; The US announced its 'toughest sanctions in history' on Iran, directly targeting China as the top buyer of Iranian oil in a bid to cut off Tehran's critical revenue. This marks a tightening of the external economic noose, but the immediate disruptive impact may be limited given the regime's long history of operating under sanctions. Meanwhile, Trump leveraged a reduction in military exercises with South Korea to pressure Seoul into joining actions against Iran, a tactic that instead exposed cracks in the US alliance system and could weaken the coordinated effort to isolate Iran. On balance, external pressure is escalating, but with no visible loosening of the internal power structure, the likelihood of the regime's near-term collapse remains materially unchanged.
3. Aug 27, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edges down from 7.5% to 6.5%, as external pressure fails to translate into a catalyst for internal collapse in the absence of new developments.; The past 24 hours were a classic 'no-news' cycle, with a complete absence of significant events concerning Iran's political situation. The previously announced US maximum pressure campaign continues to simmer, but no new substantive actions or internal Iranian responses were reported. This silence is itself a signal: the shockwaves from sanctions have yet to trigger visible cracks within the regime or large-scale social unrest. Consequently, the synthesized baseline has been nudged downward, reflecting that the lack of a flashpoint makes a sudden regime collapse in the near term appear more remote.
4. Aug 28, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as heightened tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have not yet translated into internal pressure that directly destabilizes the Iranian regime.; Over the past 24 hours, the US-Iran standoff in the Strait of Hormuz escalated markedly, with Trump's declaration of the strait as 'new US territory' drawing a sharp rebuke from Iran and heightening regional war risks. However, these external conflicts have not triggered visible political fractures or social unrest inside Iran. Instead, Iran's discussions with Oman on a joint shipping corridor demonstrate its continued capacity for diplomatic and operational initiative. In summary, external military and diplomatic pressure remains intense, but a catalyst for internal regime collapse is still absent, leaving the current likelihood unchanged.
5. Aug 29, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as the past 24 hours lacked any new events that would alter the assessment of the Iranian regime's stability.; No significant events directly related to the stability of the Iranian regime were captured during this monitoring period. Tensions stemming from the earlier standoff in the Strait of Hormuz persist, but there have been no new escalations or breakthroughs. The domestic political and social landscape in Iran also remains calm, with no signs of large-scale protests, elite fractures, or economic collapse that could destabilize the regime. In the absence of new information, the assessment of the regime's near-term fall remains unchanged.
6. Aug 30, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as new U.S. sanctions targeting Iran's shadow banking network intensify financial pressure but do not alter the core assessment of regime stability.; During this period, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the UAE branches of Egypt's Banque Misr, alleging it processed $1.8 billion for Iran's shadow banking network—the first time secondary sanctions have blocked an Egyptian bank's dollar access. The move aims to tighten the financial noose on Iran, and the UAE central bank subsequently announced an investigation. However, such economic pressure has persisted for years, and the Iranian regime has demonstrated considerable resilience, without triggering elite fractures or mass social upheaval. In the absence of domestic political shocks or external military conflicts that could directly destabilize the regime, the assessment of a near-term collapse remains unchanged.
7. Aug 31, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period, leaving the assessment of regime stability unchanged.; No new events related to Iranian regime stability emerged during this period. The previous period's U.S. sanctions targeting Iran's shadow banking network remain the most recent source of pressure, but such economic coercion has persisted for years, and the regime has demonstrated considerable resilience. Without domestic political upheaval, elite fractures, or external military conflict that could directly destabilize the regime, the assessment of a near-term collapse remains unchanged.
8. Sep 1, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood rises from 6.5% to 7.5%, as U.S.-Iran military conflict persists without directly threatening the regime's core, leading to a slight upward revision in the collapse risk assessment.; The U.S.-Iran military standoff saw a new escalation this period. U.S. forces conducted a direct strike on IRGC targets on Larak Island near the Strait of Hormuz, the first such action in a month, with Iran acknowledging casualties and vowing retaliation. Concurrently, the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff visited Israel to discuss the six-month-old joint air campaign against Iran, signaling deepening military cooperation. However, Trump's posting of a fake AI video claiming the destruction of Iran's critical Kharg Island oil terminal ironically highlighted that the conflict has not yet touched the regime's economic lifeline. Overall, external military pressure has intensified at the tactical level, but remains far from shaking the regime's foundations, warranting only a slight upward revision in the collapse probability.
9. Sep 2, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood falls from 7.5% to 6.5%, as the U.S.-Iran military conflict escalates tactically but does not directly threaten regime stability, leading to a slight downward revision.; During this period, the U.S.-Iran military standoff escalated further, with the U.S. directly striking IRGC targets on Larak Island and Iran retaliating against U.S. bases in Jordan, marking the first direct exchanges in months. The conflict drove global oil prices sharply higher, with Brent crude surpassing $90, and triggered significant turmoil in global financial markets. However, these events remain a tactical intensification of external military pressure and have not touched the core power structure or internal stability of the Iranian regime. The previous period's upward revision, based on persistent conflict, now appears slightly overdone in light of this period's fuller information, leading to a reassessment of the collapse likelihood back down to 6.5%.
10. Sep 3, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as record Hormuz shipping volumes weaken the narrative of external conflict directly destabilizing the regime, leaving the assessment unchanged.; This period saw a key counter-intuitive signal emerge from the Iran situation: despite the ongoing U.S.-Iran military conflict, daily oil transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz hit a record high since the war began. Data released by the U.S. Energy Secretary showed over 17 million barrels passing through the strait, a figure that exceeds pre-war norms. This indicates that the economic lifeline of the Iranian regime—its oil export channel—has not been paralyzed by external strikes, demonstrating greater resilience to external pressure than previously assumed. The downward revision made in the last period due to escalating military tensions is now supported by concrete data, leaving the assessment of regime collapse likelihood unchanged.
11. Sep 4, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as civilian casualties from the U.S.-Iran conflict trigger diplomatic fallout but show no internal fractures that would destabilize the regime, leaving the assessment unchanged.; The intensity and human cost of the U.S.-Iran conflict grew more visible this period, yet failed to translate into a direct threat to the regime's survival. Vice President Vance's announcement of an investigation into a deadly airstrike heightened diplomatic tensions, but also signaled that the conflict remains within a framework where both sides seek to manage escalation. More critically, the regime's demonstrated retaliatory capacity—launching counter-strikes on U.S. assets in Bahrain, Jordan, and elsewhere—reinforced its governing logic of external pressure and internal mobilization. The resilience assessment anchored by last period's Hormuz shipping data faced no material challenge, leaving the likelihood unchanged.
12. Sep 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edges up to 7.5%, but no new evidence events this period support a material shift, leaving the assessment unchanged.; No new evidence events directly related to Iranian regime stability were captured this period, leaving the information environment in a lull. The diplomatic fallout and internal resilience narrative from the prior period—driven by U.S.-Iran military clashes—was neither confirmed nor challenged. The current likelihood reading ticked up from 6.5% to 7.5%, but this minor adjustment lacks a specific event driver and appears to reflect inertial fluctuation in the existing risk premium rather than a reassessment of regime collapse probability. With no fresh information injected, the core judgment—external pressure without a breakdown in internal mobilization logic—remains intact.
13. Sep 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell to 6.5%, with no new evidence events this period, leaving the assessment unchanged.; The information environment remained quiet this period, with no new evidence events captured that directly relate to Iranian regime stability. The current likelihood reading fell from 7.5% to 6.5%, reversing the slight uptick from the previous period, but this fluctuation likewise lacks specific event drivers and reflects a natural correction of the existing risk premium. The diplomatic fallout and internal resilience assessment triggered by US-Iran military clashes in the prior period has been neither confirmed nor disproven. With no new information injected, the core judgment that the regime faces external pressure but its internal mobilization logic remains intact is maintained.
14. Sep 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, with no new evidence events this period, leaving the assessment unchanged.; The information environment remained quiet this period, with no new evidence events captured that directly relate to Iranian regime stability. The current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, unchanged from the end of the previous period, indicating that the existing risk assessment did not shift in the absence of new information. The diplomatic fallout from US-Iran military clashes and the internal resilience assessment from the prior period were neither confirmed nor refuted. Overall, the core judgment—external pressure exists but the internal mobilization logic remains intact—still holds.
15. Sep 8, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, as Iran's military posturing near the Strait of Hormuz did not alter the core logic of regime survival.; Iran's military maneuvers near the Strait of Hormuz took center stage this period, but they did not shake the core assessment of regime stability. Iran announced an imminent shipping deal with Oman while simultaneously declaring an exclusion zone under 'Operation Epic Fury' and claiming a strike on a U.S. vessel. These actions, while appearing aggressive, read more as a diplomatic and military performance aimed at reasserting influence over the critical waterway after suffering military blows. OPEC+'s decision to hold output steady, disrupted by the Iran war, confirmed the conflict's tangible economic toll, yet this external pressure did not translate into signs of regime change this period. Overall, the current likelihood held at 6.5%, with the existing logic intact.
16. Sep 9, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, with no new key events this period and the core logic of regime survival unchallenged.; No significant events directly related to the stability of the Iranian regime were captured this period, leaving the information landscape exceptionally quiet. The prior military standoff near the Strait of Hormuz saw no new reports of escalation or de-escalation, and there were no sudden signals from domestic politics, the economy, or elite dynamics. In the absence of new evidence, the assessment of the regime's likelihood of falling before 2027 remains unchanged.
17. Sep 10, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, as the sharp escalation in US-Iran military conflict has not directly challenged the regime's survival logic.; This period saw a dramatic escalation in US-Iran military confrontation, with the largest wave of tit-for-tat tanker attacks since the war began and mutual ballistic missile strikes, pushing global oil prices above $100 a barrel. However, these events primarily reflect an intensification of external military conflict and have not translated into signals of domestic political instability or elite fragmentation. The regime's control over security forces, its internal repression capacity, and the cohesion of its core leadership show no signs of wavering. Consequently, while geopolitical risks have spiked sharply, the likelihood of the regime falling before 2027 has not materially changed.
18. Sep 11, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood held steady at 6.5%, as the ripple effects of the external conflict have not touched the core stability of the Iranian regime.; During this period, the global economic shockwaves from the Iran war spread further, with the ECB forced to raise rates due to soaring oil prices and Houthi forces making military gains on a key Red Sea waterway. While these events highlight the conflict's broad impact, they remain extensions of the external situation and offer no new information about Iran's domestic power structure, elite loyalty, or social control. The core prerequisite for regime collapse—internal breakdown—showed no substantive signals in this period, leaving the assessment of its survival prospects unchanged.
19. Sep 12, 2026 UTC — baseline likelihood edged up to 7.5%, but new evidence only concerns Iran's external influence operations, not the regime's internal stability.; This period saw Anthropic disclose that Iranian-linked accounts used its AI model for influence operations targeting U.S. military forces, demonstrating the regime's persistent external aggression in cyberspace. However, this event is fundamentally an external security activity and provides no new information on the core drivers of regime collapse, such as internal fractures among Tehran's political elite, mass social protests, or economic meltdown. The public baseline reference price ticked up slightly from 6.5% to 7.5%, possibly reflecting a reinforced perception of Iran as a disruptive actor, but the fundamental internal stability underpinning the regime's survival prospects remains unchanged.
20. Sep 13, 2026 UTC — baseline likelihood held steady at 7.5%, as new evidence shows the regime embroiled in a major external war, but the impact on internal stability remains unclear.; This period saw a significant escalation in the Iranian regime's external conflicts. President Pezeshkian's attendance at the BRICS summit highlights the regime's ongoing search for international support amid war pressures. Simultaneously, attacks by its Houthi allies on a critical Saudi oil pipeline drove global oil prices above $107, potentially fueling global economic instability that could backfire on Iran. The Trump administration further used the 9/11 anniversary to justify the war, vowing to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. These events show the regime is under immense external military and diplomatic pressure, but they offer no direct evidence of internal elite fractures, economic collapse, or mass protests. The baseline reference price remained at 7.5%, suggesting the market has not yet translated the external war risk into a clear judgment on the regime's survival odds.
21. Sep 14, 2026 UTC — baseline likelihood held steady at 7.5%, with no new substantive evidence this period; judgment unchanged.; During this period from September 13 to 14, no new reports or events concerning the internal stability of the Iranian regime were detected. Developments from the prior period—such as the regime's entanglement in a major external war and the surge in oil prices following Houthi attacks—constitute immense external pressure, but have not translated into direct evidence of elite fractures, economic collapse, or mass protests. With no new information, the public baseline reference price held at 7.5%, reflecting an unchanged market assessment of the regime's likelihood of falling before 2027.
22. Sep 15, 2026 UTC — External military pressure coexists with diplomatic signals, but no evidence of internal collapse; judgment unchanged.; This period's news was dominated by actions from Iran and its proxies in geopolitical conflicts, none of which provided direct evidence about the regime's internal stability. The IRGC's declaration of a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthi seizure of a strategic Red Sea island intensified external conflicts, potentially adding economic pressure on Iran. However, Trump's statement that Iran is desperate for a deal suggests a possible de-escalation. Despite a highly volatile external environment, the lack of new reports on elite divisions, mass protests, or economic collapse leaves the baseline likelihood unchanged at 7.5%.
23. Sep 16, 2026 UTC — U.S.-Iran military friction intensifies, but no evidence of internal collapse; judgment unchanged.; During this period, U.S.-Iran military confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz escalated significantly, with the U.S. Navy destroying two Iranian vessels that attempted to seize its drone, while Iran claimed to have shot down a U.S. drone. These incidents indicate an increase in external conflict intensity, but none touch upon the internal stability of the Iranian regime. Domestically, a U.S. lawmaker introduced articles of impeachment against the Defense Secretary for unauthorized military action against Iran, reflecting political concern over the conflict's escalation, but this also does not serve as evidence of the Iranian regime's imminent collapse. With no new reports of elite divisions, mass social unrest, or economic collapse inside Iran, the baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%.
24. Sep 17, 2026 UTC — External sanctions and military attrition intensify, but no evidence of internal collapse; judgment unchanged.; This period saw the U.S. House pass a new sanctions bill against Iran, intensifying external economic pressure. Concurrently, two official U.S. reports revealed massive munitions consumption and severe stockpile shortages from the ongoing conflict, undermining the credibility of sustained U.S. military pressure, but this has not translated into internal instability for the Iranian regime. China actively engaged in diplomatic mediation, urging all parties to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran signaling a willingness to cooperate, suggesting a potential for de-escalation. With no new reports of elite fractures, mass social unrest, or economic collapse inside Iran, the baseline likelihood edged down from 7.5% to 6.5%, and the news evidence adjustment remains at zero.
25. Sep 18, 2026 UTC — No new evidence has emerged; judgment unchanged.; Since the last judgment, no new reports concerning Iran's domestic political, economic, or social situation have been received in this period. The prior assessment—that external pressure persists without evidence of internal collapse—therefore remains valid. The baseline likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no news evidence to warrant an adjustment.
26. Sep 19, 2026 UTC — The US-Iran war continues, but there is no evidence the Iranian regime faces internal collapse.; This period saw intensive reporting on the military and political dimensions of the US-Iran war, but none of it provided evidence of a direct threat to the Iranian regime's internal stability. The dispute over U.S. military deaths (Event 0) and the war crimes allegations (Event 2) primarily reflect the conflict's brutality and political pressure on the U.S. President Trump's public prediction of a swift end to the war (Event 1) is contradicted by his advisors' private assessments, and his consideration of escalating military operations (Event 4) indicates the war's trajectory remains uncertain. These external military pressures have not translated into signs of domestic political or social collapse in Iran, so the baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
27. Sep 20, 2026 UTC — External pressure on the Iranian regime intensifies, but signs of internal collapse remain absent.; This period saw the US economic stranglehold and military blockade on Iran reach a new peak, yet the Iranian regime demonstrated resilience by seeking a diplomatic off-ramp rather than showing signs of collapse. US Central Command claimed Iran's oil exports have dropped to zero (Event 1), a major escalation of external pressure that could cripple Iran's economic lifeline. However, Iran's Supreme National Security Council immediately conveyed seven conditions for talks to the US via Qatar (Event 2), indicating that Tehran is still pursuing a political solution to end hostilities and lift the blockade, contradicting a narrative of imminent internal collapse. China's opposition to new US sanctions (Event 0) and Turkey's warning against conflict spillover (Event 3) reflect complex international dynamics but offer no direct information on the regime's stability. In summary, while external economic suffocation increases pressure on the regime, its proactive diplomatic maneuvering shows its decision-making core remains functional. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
28. Sep 21, 2026 UTC — New U.S.-Iran negotiation signals emerge, but the regime's internal high-pressure control remains unchanged.; The most significant development this period is the mutual confirmation of indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran via Qatar. Trump stated he is at a 'decision-making stage,' and Iran conveyed conditions including unfreezing assets and lifting the blockade (Event 0), suggesting the diplomatic track is being seriously considered. This marks a shift from the previous period's unilateral Iranian proposal, showing increased interaction. However, the simultaneous execution of a convicted spy (Event 1) and ongoing counter-terrorism operations inside Iran highlight the regime's extreme sensitivity to internal security and its high-pressure control, demonstrating both its stability apparatus and its security anxieties. The continued U.S. naval interdiction of commercial vessels (Event 2) shows economic strangulation persists. Overall, the new diplomatic signals add a variable to the situation but are far from evidence of an imminent regime collapse. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
29. Sep 22, 2026 UTC — Diplomatic friction between Iran and the West intensifies, but the regime shows no internal signs of wavering.; During this period, diplomatic conflict between Iran and France escalated, with Iran sealing an affiliate of the French Embassy and France threatening countermeasures (Event 0). This contrasts with the previous positive signals of U.S.-Iran engagement, highlighting Tehran's hardline posture internationally. Meanwhile, the Iranian president and foreign minister traveled to New York for the UN General Assembly (Events 1, 3) and sought deeper cooperation with regional partners like Pakistan (Event 4), indicating ongoing diplomatic maneuvering. These developments reflect the regime's routine operations under external pressure, but neither the diplomatic friction nor the regional cooperation provides any evidence of a change in its internal stability. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
30. Sep 23, 2026 UTC — A diplomatic breakthrough emerges between the US and Iran, but the regime's internal stability remains directly unchallenged.; This period saw a dramatic shift in US-Iran relations. On one hand, explosions were reported near the Strait of Hormuz (Event 0), the IRGC declared readiness for a long-term war (Event 2), and the US escalated sanctions on Iranian airlines (Event 3), briefly heightening tensions. On the other hand, US President Trump confirmed a three-hour 'very productive' meeting between US and Iranian officials in New York, with plans for further talks (Events 4, 5). Iran also offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the US eases military pressure (Events 7, 10). These diplomatic signals significantly eased market fears of a military conflict, leading to a continuous drop in oil prices (Events 8, 9, 11). However, these developments primarily revolve around external conflict and diplomatic maneuvering, providing no direct evidence of a change in the Iranian regime's internal cohesion, elite support, or social stability. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
31. Sep 24, 2026 UTC — Diplomatic maneuvering and military threats escalate in parallel, but the regime's internal stability remains directly unchallenged.; This period was dominated by US-Iran confrontations at the UN General Assembly. US President Trump threatened to 'annihilate' Iran if no deal is reached after the midterms (Event 6), while Iranian President Pezeshkian responded at the UN that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons but will not yield its nuclear rights under pressure, and is ready for negotiations (Event 3). Both delegations walked out during the other's speech, highlighting deep diplomatic hostility. Simultaneously, Iran's military leadership issued warnings of 'unlimited retaliation' (Event 4) and dismissed Trump's speech as propaganda (Event 0). However, Trump also signaled a deal might be possible after the midterm elections (Event 2), which markets interpreted as room for de-escalation, pressuring oil prices. These dynamics revolve around external conflict and diplomatic posturing, providing no direct evidence of changes to the Iranian regime's internal cohesion, elite support, or social stability. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
32. Sep 25, 2026 UTC — External military pressure and diplomatic maneuvering persist, but there is no evidence of a direct challenge to the Iranian regime's internal stability.; This period saw US-Iran tensions manifest on both military and diplomatic fronts. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated a defensive posture, stating war was imposed on Iran and the country does not seek conflict (Event 1). Meanwhile, the US Senate narrowly rejected a resolution to curb the president's war powers against Iran, preserving executive discretion for military action (Event 4). On the Iranian side, a top military advisor made hawkish remarks about controlling the Strait of Hormuz (Event 2), while the human toll of extended US deployments against Iran was also disclosed (Event 3). These developments all revolve around external confrontation and provide no new evidence of changes to the Iranian regime's internal cohesion, elite support, or social stability. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
33. Sep 26, 2026 UTC — External pressure and diplomatic maneuvering escalate in parallel, but there is no evidence of a direct challenge to the Iranian regime's internal stability.; New variables emerged in Iran's external environment this period. Iraq abruptly suspended flights to and from Iran (Event 0), adding to the physical blockade pressure on Tehran without providing an official reason. On the diplomatic front, Gulf states plan to urge the US to avoid escalation with Iran at the UN General Assembly (Event 2), while Iran proposed a conditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, causing oil prices to plunge (Event 1). These developments show the international contest around Iran unfolding across military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions simultaneously. However, all new evidence points to external confrontation and negotiation, offering no new information on the Iranian regime's internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
34. Sep 27, 2026 UTC — Diplomatic engagement and military standoff proceed in parallel, with no direct impact on the Iranian regime's internal stability; baseline likelihood unchanged.; This period saw the international contest over Iran unfold along diplomatic and military tracks. Diplomatically, Iran's foreign minister briefed Saudi Arabia and Russia on a consensus reached with Oman regarding safe shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the UN General Assembly (Event 0), signaling Iran's continued effort to secure understanding from regional powers. Militarily, Trump rejected Iran's ceasefire proposal and plans to resume bombing after the midterm elections (Event 1), while Houthi attacks on Saudi targets escalated (Event 3). Iraq sought US exemptions to resume humanitarian flights (Event 2). These developments show that external pressure and diplomatic maneuvering remain intense, but none of the new evidence touches on the core issues of the Iranian regime's internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
35. Oct 12, 2026 UTC — US-Iran military confrontation escalates without directly impacting the regime's internal stability; the probability of regime collapse rises slightly but remains low.; US-Iran confrontation escalated significantly this period: the US deployed nearly 10,000 additional troops and a third aircraft carrier to the Middle East (event 11), withdrew B-1 bombers from the UK base (event 4), and Trump issued severe strike warnings. Iran denied reports of nuclear flexibility (event 6) and shifted negotiation focus to the Strait of Hormuz (event 7), indicating continued stalemate. Houthi attacks on Riyadh airport killed three Saudis (event 9), and the Saudi-led coalition launched a major offensive (event 10), intensifying regional conflict spillover. However, none of the new evidence touches core issues of regime internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest; the US troop withdrawal from Iraq (event 12) may actually strengthen Iran's regional position. The baseline likelihood rose slightly from 4.5% to 5.5%, but direct evidence pointing to regime collapse remains absent.
36. Oct 13, 2026 UTC — Regional conflict spillover intensifies without reaching the core of Iran's internal stability; the probability of regime collapse remains low and unchanged.; This period saw Houthi missile strikes on Riyadh airport killing at least 12 and injuring 309 (event 2), with the Saudi-led coalition escalating airstrikes on Yemen, marking clear regional spillover (event 0). However, these events reflect the military actions of Iran's proxy network rather than directly pointing to core issues of internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest within the Iranian regime. The US, EU, and UN warned of regional escalation (event 2), yet direct evidence threatening the regime's survival remains absent. The baseline likelihood holds at 5.5%, consistent with the evidence direction.
37. Oct 14, 2026 UTC — The UK's attribution of the Fairford plot to Iran's IRGC and subsequent sanctions raise external pressure, but do not reach the core of regime internal stability; collapse probability remains low and unchanged.; This period, the UK formally attributed the suspected terror plot at RAF Fairford to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sanctioned two Iranian nationals, summoned Iran's ambassador, and received a joint statement of support from the US State Department (event 0). This marks an escalation in direct Western accusations against Iran's proxy activities, but the event reflects Iran's external behavior rather than core issues of regime internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest. The UK PM said the plot was "highly likely" coordinated from inside Iran, yet no evidence directly threatens regime survival was provided. The baseline likelihood remains at 5.5% unchanged, consistent with the evidence.
38. Oct 15, 2026 UTC — Iran's escalation of shipping attacks near the Strait of Hormuz shows increased external adventurism, but does not reach the core of internal stability; collapse probability remains low and unchanged.; Multiple cargo and container ships sank near the Strait of Hormuz as Iran escalated attacks on shipping, with the IRGC claiming a mine strike and Reuters sources reporting a projectile hit. Officials cited in reports say Iran is shifting tactics to intensify attacks before the US vote, and oil prices rose. This reflects external military adventurism rather than core factors of regime survival such as internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest. The baseline likelihood remains at 5.5%, consistent with the evidence.
39. Oct 16, 2026 UTC — Iran's escalated shipping attacks near the Strait of Hormuz show increased external adventurism, but do not reach the core of internal stability; collapse probability remains low and unchanged.; During this period, multiple cargo and container ships sank near the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran's Revolutionary Guard claiming a vessel carrying 2,500 containers struck a mine and sank, while a Reuters source said another container ship was hit by ammunition and sank (event 0). Reports citing officials say Iran is adjusting tactics and intensifying attacks on shipping ahead of the US vote, with oil prices rising. This reflects an escalation in Iran's external military adventurism rather than core factors determining regime survival such as internal cohesion, elite support, or social unrest. The baseline likelihood remains at 5.5%, consistent with the evidence.