Saudi joins Abraham Accords pre-2027?

Earlier updates

The chart shows each outcome’s published likelihood, including its baseline and news adjustment at that time.

1. Jul 24, 2026 UTC — current likelihood indicates a very low probability (12%) of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027, with no directly relevant events this period to alter that assessment.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Will Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords before 2027?' remained stable at 12%, showing no change. Despite several major events reshaping the Middle East's geopolitical landscape—such as the escalation and subsequent peace deal in the US-Iran conflict, Houthi attacks on Saudi tankers, and a new US-Saudi civilian nuclear deal—none directly addressed the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The low current likelihood reflects an environment where this issue is not a regional diplomatic priority, and recent developments have failed to provide any positive momentum toward an agreement.
2. Jul 25, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edged up slightly to 13%, but the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains very low, with no directly relevant events this period.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' saw a marginal increase from 12% to 13%. The sole evidence event was Trump's hawkish remarks on the US-Iran conflict, which have no direct bearing on the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The slight market fluctuation may reflect a minor reassessment of the shifting Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape, but the overall assessment remains unchanged: the issue lacks momentum for substantive progress in the current environment.
3. Jul 26, 2026 UTC — current likelihood fell 2 percentage points to 11%, with the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remaining very low and no relevant events this period.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' edged down from 13% to 11%, continuing the very low probability trend. The sole evidence event was a sports news story about a footballer's transfer, completely unrelated to the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The slight dip in current likelihood likely reflects further cooling of expectations in the absence of any positive developments.
4. Jul 27, 2026 UTC — current likelihood fell 2.5 percentage points to 8.5%, with the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords declining further and no directly relevant events this period.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' fell further from 11% to 8.5%, continuing the very low probability trend. Among the evidence events, F1's relocation of the Bahrain Grand Prix to Malaysia and cancellation of the Saudi race due to security concerns from the Iran war highlights ongoing geopolitical instability in the Middle East, which may indirectly weaken the external environment for Saudi Arabia to advance normalization with Israel. The other event was a boxing match in Saudi Arabia, unrelated to the topic. The decline in current likelihood reflects further cooling of expectations amid a lack of positive developments and continued regional conflict.
5. Jul 28, 2026 UTC — current likelihood rose 4 percentage points to 12.5%, but the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains very low, with Houthi threats against Saudi oil intensifying regional instability.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' rebounded from 8.5% to 12.5%, but remains extremely low. The key event was the Houthi militia's announcement of a maritime embargo on Saudi oil through the Red Sea, directly threatening Saudi Arabia's economic lifeline and causing a sharp drop in Bab el-Mandeb Strait traffic. This development, intertwined with broader regional conflicts such as the Iranian vessel attack in the Caspian Sea, underscores the continued deterioration of the Middle East security environment, fundamentally undermining the geopolitical basis for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Other events were sports transfer news, irrelevant to the topic. The slight rebound in current likelihood likely reflects short-term volatility rather than fundamental improvement.
6. Jul 29, 2026 UTC — current likelihood plunged 6 percentage points to 6.5%, further reducing the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, as attacks on Saudi soil make normalization prospects even more remote.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' plummeted from 12.5% to 6.5%, hitting a new low. The decisive event was the coordinated drone and missile attacks by Iran-backed Houthis and Iraqi militias targeting Saudi oil facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh. This direct military action against Saudi territory represents a major escalation of the regional conflict, completely destroying the security environment necessary for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Although Netanyahu visited Washington to coordinate strategy on Iran, the widening war makes it even less likely for Saudi Arabia to make a controversial diplomatic pivot at this time. Other events were sports and financial news, irrelevant to the topic.
7. Jul 30, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edged up 1 percentage point to 7.5%, as US-Saudi joint airstrikes on Iraqi militias escalate regional conflict, but the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains extremely low.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' ticked up slightly from 6.5% to 7.5%, but remains near historic lows. The key event was the joint US-Saudi airstrikes against Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, retaliating for earlier attacks on Saudi oil facilities. This military action signals strengthened US-Saudi security cooperation, which may have injected a sliver of optimism into the market, but it simultaneously escalates regional tensions, further complicating the diplomatic environment needed for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Other events were sports and financial news, irrelevant to the topic.
8. Jul 31, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with no geopolitical or diplomatic events this period shifting the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' remained unchanged at 7.5%, continuing its extremely low level. Although a significant geopolitical event occurred—a drone strike on US-owned LNG ships at Egypt's Damietta port—it did not directly involve Saudi Arabia or Israel, nor did it alter the regional diplomatic landscape. All other high-signal events were football-related news, including personnel changes at clubs owned by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund, which are entirely irrelevant to the Abraham Accords. Consequently, this period lacked any substantive evidence to advance the issue.
9. Aug 1, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with no events this period shifting the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.; The public signal's pricing for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 remained frozen at 7.5% this period. The information environment was completely empty, with no geopolitical, diplomatic, or economic events touching on Saudi-Israeli normalization. With no new evidence to digest, the market's judgment simply carried forward the prior period's stagnation.
10. Aug 2, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with two commercial and sports events this period having no bearing on Saudi-Israeli normalization.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' remained stuck at 7.5%, unchanged from the previous cycle. Two Saudi-related stories entered the information environment—Prince Alwaleed's increased stake in Lucid Motors and Al-Hilal's transfer dispute with Barcelona over João Cancelo—but both belong squarely to the realms of commerce and football, with zero connection to Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations. Absent any geopolitical or diplomatic signal, the market's judgment simply carried forward its prior stasis.
11. Aug 3, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edges down to 6.5% as US-Iran conflict sees a diplomatic opening, but Saudi Arabia's role remains unclear, keeping normalization prospects at a low level.; This period saw the public signal's pricing for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords dip slightly from 7.5% to 6.5%, continuing the low-probability range. The only geopolitically relevant event was Trump's announcement of a suspension of planned US-Israeli strikes on Iran, claiming a preliminary deal framework had been reached. If implemented, such a deal could reshape the Middle East security landscape, but reports made no mention of Saudi Arabia's role or stance, nor any reference to Saudi-Israeli normalization. The other event, concerning FIFA's commercialization reform, was entirely unrelated. The slight market decline likely reflects cautious sentiment toward regional uncertainty rather than a direct judgment on Saudi diplomatic moves.
12. Aug 4, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% as the Gaza ceasefire deal does not involve Saudi Arabia, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remained at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the previous assessment. The sole development was Trump's announcement of a US-brokered, phased disarmament deal for Gaza involving Israeli troop withdrawal and an international stabilization force. While the deal could reshape the regional security landscape if implemented, the reporting made no mention of Saudi Arabia's role, stance, or any normalization with Israel. The absence of any signal directly tied to the core question left the analytical basis entirely unchanged.
13. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no directly relevant developments this period, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the previous assessment. The two pieces of information that emerged are unrelated to Saudi-Israeli normalization: one is a power struggle between UEFA and FIFA leadership, and the other is oil price volatility driven by U.S. military strikes on Iran. The former concerns global football governance, while the latter, though touching on Middle Eastern geopolitics, focuses entirely on energy markets and military confrontation, with no mention of Saudi Arabia's diplomatic moves or stance on the Accords. With no signal to advance the normalization process, the basis for judgment remains unchanged.
14. Aug 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no directly relevant developments this period, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords held at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the prior assessment. The sole event was the Saudi Public Investment Fund's completion of a record $55 billion acquisition of Electronic Arts, the largest leveraged buyout in history. While the deal involves Jared Kushner's Affinity Partners—Kushner having championed the Abraham Accords during his father-in-law Trump's administration—the coverage focused entirely on deal structure, financing, and gaming industry implications, with no mention of diplomatic signals or political conditions tied to Saudi-Israeli normalization. With no substantive developments to shift the normalization trajectory, the assessment basis remains unchanged.
15. Aug 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no relevant events this period, leaving the normalization outlook unchanged.; No reports or events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The current likelihood remains at a low 6.5%, unchanged from the previous period. With no new information to shift the normalization outlook in either direction, the assessment carries forward unchanged.
16. Aug 8, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged up to 7.5%, but with no new events this period, the assessment basis remains unchanged.; No reports or events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The current likelihood ticked up from 6.5% to 7.5%, but this minor shift lacks concrete information to back it. The assessment basis carries over entirely from the previous period. The normalization outlook remains in low-probability territory, awaiting substantive diplomatic signals for any reassessment.
17. Aug 9, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged down to 6.5%, with the sole event this period unrelated to the Accords, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; The only Saudi-related report this period concerned Saudi clubs pursuing Barcelona's Marc Casadó, a story entirely unrelated to the Abraham Accords or normalization diplomacy. The current likelihood edged down from 7.5% to 6.5%, a minor shift unsupported by any substantive diplomatic signal, leaving the assessment basis unchanged from the prior period. The prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Accords remains in low-probability territory, pending concrete developments in bilateral relations or regional diplomacy.
18. Aug 10, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with the newly emerged joint defense pact unrelated to the Abraham Accords, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; The sole relevant event this period was Saudi Arabia signing the Mecca Joint Defense Pact with Pakistan and Turkey. The agreement focuses on collective security and military cooperation among the three nations to address regional threats, but its content does not touch on normalization with Israel or the Abraham Accords framework. The current likelihood remains unchanged from the previous period at 6.5%, a low-probability state reflecting that Saudi Arabia's diplomatic priorities remain centered on security alliances rather than reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive diplomatic signals to advance the Accords process.
19. Aug 11, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca joint defense pact confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a clear separation in Saudi Arabia's diplomatic agenda between security alliances and reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
20. Aug 12, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, confirmed in the previous period, remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting the continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its stance on reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
21. Aug 13, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it centers on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its path toward reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
22. Aug 14, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its path toward reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
23. Aug 15, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as further details of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement emerge but do not alter the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects.; This period saw further details of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement come to light, confirming that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey will treat an armed attack on any one as an attack on all. The pact focuses on collective security and regional stability, leveraging Saudi financial power, Turkish military capabilities, and Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, but makes no mention of relations with Israel. The current likelihood remains at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi moves on the security front remain distinct from the Abraham Accords process, with no substantive signal toward normalization.
24. Aug 16, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement details disclosed in the prior period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but the pact focuses on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey without addressing ties with Israel. The current likelihood holds at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi security architecture moves remain compartmentalized from the normalization track in the absence of substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
25. Aug 17, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca joint defense pact details disclosed in the prior period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but that agreement centers on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey and does not touch on relations with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi Arabia's security architecture adjustments remain compartmentalized from the normalization track in the absence of any substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
26. Aug 18, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Pact details disclosed in the previous period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but that agreement centers on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey without touching on relations with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi Arabia's security architecture adjustments remain compartmentalized from the normalization process in the absence of substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
27. Aug 19, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as escalating Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities show no direct impact on Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects.; This period saw an escalation in Houthi drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's Jazan refinery, but the development primarily reflects the long-running security conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran-backed Houthi forces, without touching on the core issues of Saudi-Israeli normalization. The actual damage was limited, and the refinery had already been shut down due to prior damage, keeping the overall impact on Saudi Arabia's security posture contained. The current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, indicating that intensifying regional security frictions are not yet sufficient to alter the baseline assessment of the normalization process, absent substantive political signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
28. Aug 20, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was already fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security dynamics and not spilling over into the political process of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing for rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
29. Aug 21, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Absent substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
30. Aug 22, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully absorbed in the last cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Absent substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
31. Aug 23, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
32. Aug 24, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully absorbed in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
33. Aug 25, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
34. Aug 26, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged up from 6.5% to 8.5%, though no new events emerged this period to substantiate the move.; No new events directly tied to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords surfaced this period. While the synthesized likelihood ticked up from 6.5% to 8.5%, the move lacks traceable news events or diplomatic signals, reflecting statistical fluctuation rather than a fundamental improvement. With no high-level contacts, policy shifts, or third-party mediation breakthroughs on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term outlook remains dim.
35. Aug 27, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged from the prior assessment.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized likelihood remains at a low 8.5%. After the slight uptick in the prior period, the absence of follow-up diplomatic signals or policy moves leaves that level without further reinforcement. With no high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
36. Aug 28, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, leaving the synthesized likelihood unchanged at a low 8.5%. The modest uptick from the prior period has received no follow-through in the form of diplomatic signals or policy moves, depriving that level of further reinforcement. Without high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
37. Aug 29, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized likelihood remains at a low 8.5%. After the slight uptick in the prior period, the absence of follow-up diplomatic signals or policy moves leaves that level without further reinforcement. With no high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
38. Aug 30, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell from 8.5% to 7.5% with no new events this period, keeping the outlook subdued.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized read shows likelihood edging down from 8.5% to 7.5%. The absence of high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress meant the faint optimism from the prior period could not be sustained. Without concrete signals of movement on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospects for a deal before 2027 remain very dim.
39. Aug 31, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with no new events this period, extending the low-level stagnation.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, leaving the synthesized likelihood unchanged from the previous period at 7.5%. Two consecutive periods without high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress have left no foothold for even tentative optimism. With no substantive signals of movement toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains very remote.
40. Sep 1, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with only a football transfer story this period, irrelevant to the accord's prospects, extending the low-level stagnation.; The only matched event this period was Al Hilal nearing a deal for Arsenal winger Gabriel Martinelli, a routine sports acquisition by a Saudi club with no bearing on the diplomatic normalization process covered by the Abraham Accords. With multiple consecutive periods lacking high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress, there is nothing to anchor any optimism. Absent substantive signals of progress in Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains very dim.
41. Sep 2, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with no relevant events this period, extending the low-level stagnation.; No events related to Saudi-Israeli relations or the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The information vacuum across multiple consecutive periods means there are neither positive signals pushing normalization forward nor negative statements that completely shut the door. Without high-level interactions, third-party mediation, or any softening of Saudi Arabia's official stance, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains extremely dim.
42. Sep 3, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with no relevant events this period, extending the low-level stagnation.; No events related to Saudi-Israeli relations or the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. The information vacuum extending across multiple cycles means there are neither positive signals pushing normalization forward nor negative statements completely shutting the door. With no high-level interactions, third-party mediation, or shifts in Saudi Arabia's official stance, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains extremely dim.
43. Sep 4, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood drops to 6.5% as the information vacuum persists, further weakening the outlook.; No substantive events related to Saudi-Israeli relations or the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. Days of continued silence have put further downward pressure on an already slim likelihood, with the current read edging down from 7.5% to 6.5%. Without signs of high-level contact, diplomatic mediation, or a shift in Saudi Arabia's official stance, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains almost entirely stalled.
44. Sep 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edges up to 7.5%, but the information vacuum persists without any substantive progress.; No reports or events directly related to Saudi-Israeli normalization emerged during this period. While the synthesized likelihood edged up from 6.5% to 7.5%, this reflects low-level consolidation rather than any new diplomatic movement. Days of continued silence leave the prospect of joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 in a near-stalled state, with no signs of high-level contact or policy shifts.
45. Sep 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood falls to 6.5%, as the information vacuum persists and the outlook remains dim.; Another period has passed without any relevant developments. No new reports or diplomatic signals regarding Saudi-Israeli normalization have emerged, marking consecutive days of silence. The synthesized read shows the current likelihood has edged down from 7.5% to 6.5%, further confirming that expectations for a near-term breakthrough are steadily fading. With no signs of high-level contacts, policy shifts, or third-party mediation, the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 remains extremely remote.
46. Sep 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as the information vacuum persists and the outlook remains dim.; Another period has passed without any relevant developments. No new reports or diplomatic signals regarding Saudi-Israeli normalization have emerged, extending the information vacuum that has now persisted for several days. The synthesized read holds steady at 6.5%, further confirming that expectations for a near-term breakthrough have largely evaporated. With no signs of high-level engagement, policy shifts, or third-party mediation, the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 remains extremely remote.
47. Sep 8, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as the information vacuum persists and the outlook remains dim.; Another cycle has passed without any relevant developments. No new reports or diplomatic signals regarding Saudi-Israeli normalization have emerged, extending a multi-day information vacuum. The synthesized read holds the current likelihood steady at 6.5%, reinforcing that expectations for a near-term breakthrough have largely faded. With no high-level contacts, policy shifts, or third-party mediation signals, the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 remains extremely remote.
48. Sep 9, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as a report on a historical conflict fails to shift the outlook.; Only one Saudi-related report appeared this period, but it was a retrospective on the 2022 Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities—entirely unrelated to the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The article involved no diplomatic engagement and conveyed no signal of any shift in Saudi Arabia's stance on the Abraham Accords. Against a backdrop of days-long silence on substantive progress, this event provides no valid evidence either for or against normalization. The synthesized read holds the current likelihood at 6.5%, and the prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the accords before 2027 remains exceedingly dim.
49. Sep 10, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events occurring this period.; No news reports related to Saudi Arabia or the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. In the absence of new information, the outlook for Saudi Arabia joining the accords before 2027 remains unchanged. The continued information vacuum further confirms the stagnation of the diplomatic process, with the current likelihood holding at a low of 6.5%.
50. Sep 11, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events occurring this period.; No news reports related to Saudi Arabia or the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. With no new information to process, the assessment of Saudi Arabia joining the accords before 2027 remains unchanged. The continued information vacuum reinforces the picture of a stalled diplomatic process, with the current likelihood holding at a low 6.5%.
51. Sep 12, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events occurring this period.; No news reports related to Saudi Arabia or the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. With no new information to process, the assessment of Saudi Arabia joining the accords before 2027 remains unchanged. The continued information vacuum reinforces the view of a stalled diplomatic process, with the current likelihood holding at a low 6.5%.
52. Sep 13, 2026 UTC — The security situation has sharply deteriorated, dimming the prospects for diplomatic progress and further reducing the likelihood of joining the accords.; This period saw a sharp escalation in regional security tensions, with Houthi forces seizing the strategic port of Mocha and launching drone attacks that forced Saudi Arabia to shut down its critical East-West crude pipeline. These Iran-backed attacks directly intensified the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iranian proxies, severely undermining the security environment and political will necessary for normalization with Israel. While the public baseline reference price remains at 6.5%, we applied a -3.0 pp editorial adjustment due to this material deterioration in the security situation, lowering the final likelihood from the previous 6.5% to 3.5%.
53. Sep 14, 2026 UTC — The security situation remains tense with a critical infrastructure attack, keeping the diplomatic outlook bleak.; During this period, Saudi Arabia's east-west oil pipeline was hit by a drone attack launched from Iraq, causing injuries and material damage. This incident further confirms the fragility of the regional security environment, directly undermining the core prerequisite for Saudi-Israeli normalization—a stable security situation. While the public baseline reference price remained unchanged at 6.5%, this attack provides new evidence supporting the prior judgment of a deteriorating security landscape, indicating that obstacles to a diplomatic breakthrough remain immense.
54. Sep 15, 2026 UTC — A critical oil infrastructure attack worsens regional security, further obstructing the diplomatic process.; This period saw Houthi drone strikes force the shutdown of Saudi Arabia's critical East-West oil pipeline, causing oil prices to surge and Saudi production to fall to its lowest level in decades. The attack not only exposed the vulnerability of Saudi infrastructure but also directly worsened the regional security environment essential for Saudi-Israeli normalization. The subsequent postponement of diplomatic talks between Iran and Gulf states further indicates escalating regional tensions. The baseline likelihood remains at 6.5%, but the new evidence reinforces the judgment that the security situation remains tense and the outlook for a diplomatic breakthrough is bleak.
55. Sep 16, 2026 UTC — The Yemen conflict escalates sharply, the regional security environment continues to deteriorate, and the outlook for the diplomatic process remains bleak.; The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis escalated significantly this period. The Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on a critical Saudi oil pipeline, suspending loadings at Yanbu port, while Saudi Arabia was accused of launching over 300 airstrikes across Yemen in five days. These tit-for-tat military actions, combined with emergency security alerts in Saudi cities, paint a picture of a rapidly deteriorating regional security situation. Although the baseline likelihood remains unchanged at 6.5%, new evidence suggests the security environment necessary for Saudi-Israeli normalization is not improving but further worsening, making a diplomatic breakthrough in the near term highly unlikely.
56. Sep 17, 2026 UTC — A key oil facility is set to resume operations soon, but an attempted attack on a religious holy site underscores the fragility of the security situation, leaving the diplomatic process stalled.; This period presented subtle and contradictory signals regarding the regional situation. On one hand, the U.S. Energy Secretary announced that the previously damaged Saudi East-West oil pipeline would resume operations within days, easing immediate concerns about global energy supply disruptions. On the other hand, the Saudi-led coalition intercepted a Houthi drone near Mecca, Islam's holiest city, marking the second such attempt on the holy site since 2017, though the Houthis denied it. This incident shows that the threat from the Yemen conflict to Saudi Arabia's core interests has not receded and has even touched upon a more sensitive religious red line. With the baseline likelihood unchanged at 6.5%, this contradictory evidence provides no clear directional change for the prospects of Saudi-Israeli normalization, leaving the diplomatic process mired in a security dilemma.
57. Sep 18, 2026 UTC — The swift restoration of the oil pipeline eases immediate economic pressure, but the Houthi military advance on a key Red Sea chokepoint deepens the security dilemma, leaving the diplomatic outlook bleak.; This period saw Saudi Arabia's security and economic challenges evolve in opposite directions. On one hand, Saudi Aramco's rapid workaround to restore half of the East-West oil pipeline's capacity within days, coupled with the U.S. Energy Secretary downplaying the disruption, temporarily eased fears of economic turmoil from damaged critical infrastructure. On the other hand, the Houthis' significant advance along the Red Sea coast and seizure of the Bab al-Mandeb strait not only directly threatens global shipping but also highlights the growing strength of Saudi Arabia's adversary, placing the Kingdom in a deeper strategic bind in the Yemen conflict. The baseline likelihood remains unchanged at 6.5%, as these conflicting signals failed to alter the market's pessimistic outlook on Saudi-Israeli normalization, with the deteriorating security situation fundamentally foreclosing any space for a diplomatic breakthrough.
58. Sep 19, 2026 UTC — The U.S. approval of the F-35 sale sends a signal of strategic support, but the worsening Red Sea shipping crisis sustains a bleak diplomatic outlook amid conflicting signals.; This period's core tension shifted from domestic economic pressure to a contest between external security and diplomatic signals. On one hand, the U.S. State Department approved a massive $24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35 jets to Saudi Arabia, widely seen as a clear signal of long-term security commitment and strategic support for a key ally, theoretically creating a more favorable diplomatic environment. On the other hand, the Houthi military advance on the Red Sea coast is having tangible consequences, with Saudi exports through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait plummeting to one-third of normal levels, directly confirming a deepening security dilemma. The baseline likelihood edged up from 6.5% to 7.5%, but this minor fluctuation does not alter the market's pessimistic outlook on normalization prospects, as the worsening security situation fundamentally neutralizes any potential diplomatic momentum generated by the arms sale.
59. Sep 20, 2026 UTC — Direct Houthi attacks on Riyadh sharply worsen the security environment, further dimming normalization prospects.; This period saw a dangerous escalation in Saudi Arabia's security situation. Houthi forces claimed to have launched ballistic missiles at Riyadh, with Saudi air defenses intercepting projectiles over the capital and explosions reported near King Khalid International Airport. These attacks bring the conflict directly to Saudi Arabia's political heartland, fundamentally undermining the security and stability required for any diplomatic process. The Turkish foreign minister's statement confirmed the severity of the attacks and noted Saudi Arabia's reluctance to be drawn into a US-Iran conflict. The baseline likelihood is 8.5%, but given the sharply deteriorating security environment, we applied a -3 percentage point news evidence adjustment, bringing the final probability down from the previous period's 7.5% to 5.5%, a delta of -2.0 pp.
60. Sep 21, 2026 UTC — Turkey's military support pledge strengthens Saudi security alliances but does not directly advance normalization, leaving prospects dim.; This period, Turkey pledged military-technical assistance to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement, signaling new regional security backing for Riyadh as it faces Houthi threats. However, this development does not directly involve normalization with Israel. Instead, it underscores that Saudi Arabia's immediate priority is addressing a pressing security crisis, not advancing the Abraham Accords. The baseline likelihood is 7.5%, reflecting a persistently bearish outlook. As the new evidence does not alter the core logic that a deteriorating security environment blocks normalization, we maintain a -2 percentage point news evidence adjustment, keeping the final probability unchanged at 5.5%.
61. Sep 22, 2026 UTC — The UK's provision of defensive air refueling support strengthens Saudi security alliances but does not directly advance normalization with Israel, leaving prospects dim.; This period saw the UK announce defensive air-to-air refueling support for Saudi Arabia in response to Houthi threats, marking new Western military backing for the Kingdom as it grapples with a security crisis. However, this development does not directly involve the normalization process with Israel. On the contrary, it further underscores that Saudi Arabia's immediate priority is addressing the pressing regional security crisis, not advancing the Abraham Accords. The baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%, reflecting the market's persistently dim view of the prospects. As the new evidence does not alter the core logic that the deteriorating security situation hinders normalization, we maintain our previous judgment.
62. Sep 23, 2026 UTC — Saudi Arabia's restart of its oil export pipeline signals regional de-escalation but has no direct bearing on normalization, leaving prospects dim.; This period saw Saudi Arabia restart its East-West pipeline and prepare to resume crude exports from Yanbu port, while Iran signaled openness to diplomatic contact, jointly driving down oil prices. These developments indicate Saudi Arabia is proactively mitigating the risk of oil supply disruptions from regional conflict, but the core driver is safeguarding its own energy export security and economic interests, not creating conditions for normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%, unchanged. The new evidence does not address the fundamental obstacles to normalization—namely, the lack of progress on the Palestinian issue and Saudi domestic political calculations—so we maintain our previous judgment.
63. Sep 24, 2026 UTC — The US reaffirmed its defense commitment to Saudi Arabia, but this does not address the core obstacles to normalization, leaving prospects dim.; This period, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly stated the US will fulfill its defense agreement commitments to Saudi Arabia and described the Houthi conflict as 'very dangerous.' This stance reinforces the US-Saudi security bond but is fundamentally crisis management in response to current regional military threats, not a diplomatic move to advance the Abraham Accords. The baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%, unchanged. The new evidence does not address the fundamental obstacles to normalization—namely, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and Saudi domestic political considerations—so we maintain our previous judgment.
64. Sep 25, 2026 UTC — Regional security crisis deepens with multinational military involvement, but no new movement on diplomatic normalization.; During this period, Saudi Arabia faced severe regional security challenges. France announced the deployment of defensive military assets to Yanbu to protect oil facilities from Houthi attacks, while Saudi Arabia itself is grappling with shipping disruptions following an attack on a key pipeline, forcing it to sell crude to Asia on an emergency basis while bearing high war-risk shipping costs. These developments underscore that Saudi Arabia's immediate focus is on countering pressing military and economic threats, not on the political and diplomatic processes required to advance the Abraham Accords. The baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%, unchanged. The new evidence is entirely focused on security and energy crises and does not address the fundamental obstacles to normalization, so we maintain our previous judgment.
65. Sep 26, 2026 UTC — Regional security cooperation intensifies, but diplomatic normalization remains without direct progress.; During this period, Saudi Arabia's diplomatic and military agenda was entirely dominated by the regional security crisis. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan announced an emergency chiefs of staff meeting to discuss joint defense support, while French President Macron confirmed the deployment of military assets to Yanbu to protect oil facilities. These actions indicate that Riyadh's immediate priority is consolidating military alliances to counter the direct threat from the Houthis. Despite deepening multinational defense cooperation, the new evidence does not touch on any political or diplomatic steps toward normalization with Israel, and the fundamental obstacles to the Abraham Accords remain. The baseline likelihood held steady at 7.5%.
66. Sep 27, 2026 UTC — Judgment maintained: Regional security cooperation intensifies, but diplomatic normalization remains without direct progress.; No new reports were received during this period, so the judgment on the prospects of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains unchanged. The dynamic established in the previous period persists: Riyadh's attention is entirely focused on regional security cooperation to counter the Houthi threat, including chiefs-of-staff meetings with Turkey and Pakistan, and French military deployments to protect Yanbu's oil facilities. These actions solidify military alliances but do not address the core political obstacles to normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood remains at 7.5%, with no news evidence to support an adjustment.
67. Oct 12, 2026 UTC — Judgment maintained: Saudi Arabia remains mired in the Yemen conflict and regional security crisis, with no direct progress on normalization with Israel.; This period, Saudi Arabia's focus remained on countering Houthi attacks and the escalating Yemen conflict, not on diplomatic normalization with Israel. The deadly Houthi strike on Riyadh's airport and the Saudi-backed offensive by Yemeni government forces show Riyadh is deeply embroiled in regional conflict. Concurrently, Saudi Arabia's UN demand to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz highlights its priority on energy security. Although a flight made an emergency diversion to Saudi Arabia, this was an isolated incident and not evidence of a normalization process. The baseline likelihood remains at 4.5%, with no news evidence supporting an adjustment.
68. Oct 13, 2026 UTC — Judgment maintained: Saudi Arabia remains mired in the Yemen conflict and regional security crisis, with no direct progress on normalization with Israel.; This period, Houthi missile and drone strikes on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport killed at least 12 and injured 309, forcing the airport to close and suspend flights, with a second projectile hitting Terminal 4 the following day. Saudi Arabia reportedly struck Sanaa airport in retaliation, the US weighed military support, and the EU widened its airspace warning. These events show Riyadh's focus remains on countering Houthi attacks and the escalating Yemen war, not on diplomatic normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood stays at 4.5%, with no news evidence supporting an adjustment.
69. Oct 14, 2026 UTC — Saudi Arabia remains mired in the Yemen conflict and regional security crisis with no direct progress on normalization with Israel, though the baseline likelihood ticked up slightly.; No new direct reporting arrived this period, so the previous judgment is maintained. The Houthi missile and drone attack on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport killed at least 12 and wounded 309, forcing a temporary closure, with Saudi Arabia reportedly striking Sanaa airport in retaliation and the US weighing military support. These events show Riyadh's focus remains on countering Houthi attacks and the escalating Yemen war rather than diplomatic normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood rose slightly from 4.5% to 6.5%, but no news evidence supports this move, nor is there sufficient new evidence to justify an adjustment.
70. Oct 15, 2026 UTC — Saudi Arabia remains mired in the Yemen conflict and regional security crisis with no direct progress on normalization with Israel, though the baseline likelihood ticked down slightly.; No new direct reporting on Saudi-Israel normalization arrived this period, so the prior judgment is maintained. Houthi missile strikes hit Saudi Aramco's Dhahran headquarters and sparked a fire, Saudi Arabia intercepted a missile targeting Riyadh, the coalition struck a fuel depot in Sanaa, and the Houthis vowed further attacks on Saudi airports and oil facilities. These events show Riyadh's focus remains on countering Houthi attacks and the escalating Yemen war rather than diplomatic normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood slipped from 6.5% to 5.5%, but no news evidence supports this move, and no evidence was found to justify adjusting the baseline.
71. Oct 16, 2026 UTC — Saudi Arabia remains mired in the Yemen conflict and regional security crisis with no direct progress on normalization with Israel, and the baseline likelihood is unchanged.; No new direct reporting on Saudi-Israel normalization arrived this period, so the prior judgment is maintained. Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Aramco's Dhahran headquarters caused a fire, Saudi forces intercepted missiles aimed at Riyadh, coalition airstrikes hit a Sanaa fuel depot, and the Houthis vowed to continue striking Saudi airports and oil facilities. These events show Riyadh's focus remains on countering Houthi attacks and the escalating Yemen war rather than diplomatic normalization with Israel. The baseline likelihood holds at 5.5%, with no news evidence supporting any adjustment.