Will Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords before 2027?

Earlier updates

1. Jul 24, 2026 UTC — current likelihood indicates a very low probability (12%) of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027, with no directly relevant events this period to alter that assessment.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Will Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords before 2027?' remained stable at 12%, showing no change. Despite several major events reshaping the Middle East's geopolitical landscape—such as the escalation and subsequent peace deal in the US-Iran conflict, Houthi attacks on Saudi tankers, and a new US-Saudi civilian nuclear deal—none directly addressed the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The low current likelihood reflects an environment where this issue is not a regional diplomatic priority, and recent developments have failed to provide any positive momentum toward an agreement.
2. Jul 25, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edged up slightly to 13%, but the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains very low, with no directly relevant events this period.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' saw a marginal increase from 12% to 13%. The sole evidence event was Trump's hawkish remarks on the US-Iran conflict, which have no direct bearing on the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The slight likelihood fluctuation may reflect a minor reassessment of the shifting Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape, but the overall assessment remains unchanged: the issue lacks momentum for substantive progress in the current environment.
3. Jul 26, 2026 UTC — current likelihood fell 2 percentage points to 11%, with the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remaining very low and no relevant events this period.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' edged down from 13% to 11%, continuing the very low probability trend. The sole evidence event was a sports news story about a footballer's transfer, completely unrelated to the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The slight dip in current likelihood likely reflects further cooling of expectations in the absence of any positive developments.
4. Jul 27, 2026 UTC — current likelihood fell 2.5 percentage points to 8.5%, with the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords declining further and no directly relevant events this period.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' fell further from 11% to 8.5%, continuing the very low probability trend. Among the evidence events, F1's relocation of the Bahrain Grand Prix to Malaysia and cancellation of the Saudi race due to security concerns from the Iran war highlights ongoing geopolitical instability in the Middle East, which may indirectly weaken the external environment for Saudi Arabia to advance normalization with Israel. The other event was a boxing match in Saudi Arabia, unrelated to the topic. The decline in current likelihood reflects further cooling of expectations amid a lack of positive developments and continued regional conflict.
5. Jul 28, 2026 UTC — current likelihood rose 4 percentage points to 12.5%, but the probability of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains very low, with Houthi threats against Saudi oil intensifying regional instability.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' rebounded from 8.5% to 12.5%, but remains extremely low. The key event was the Houthi militia's announcement of a maritime embargo on Saudi oil through the Red Sea, directly threatening Saudi Arabia's economic lifeline and causing a sharp drop in Bab el-Mandeb Strait traffic. This development, intertwined with broader regional conflicts such as the Iranian vessel attack in the Caspian Sea, underscores the continued deterioration of the Middle East security environment, fundamentally undermining the geopolitical basis for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Other events were sports transfer news, irrelevant to the topic. The slight rebound in current likelihood likely reflects short-term volatility rather than fundamental improvement.
6. Jul 29, 2026 UTC — current likelihood plunged 6 percentage points to 6.5%, further reducing the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, as attacks on Saudi soil make normalization prospects even more remote.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' plummeted from 12.5% to 6.5%, hitting a new low. The decisive event was the coordinated drone and missile attacks by Iran-backed Houthis and Iraqi militias targeting Saudi oil facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh. This direct military action against Saudi territory represents a major escalation of the regional conflict, completely destroying the security environment necessary for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Although Netanyahu visited Washington to coordinate strategy on Iran, the widening war makes it even less likely for Saudi Arabia to make a controversial diplomatic pivot at this time. Other events were sports and financial news, irrelevant to the topic.
7. Jul 30, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edged up 1 percentage point to 7.5%, as US-Saudi joint airstrikes on Iraqi militias escalate regional conflict, but the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains extremely low.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' ticked up slightly from 6.5% to 7.5%, but remains near historic lows. The key event was the joint US-Saudi airstrikes against Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, retaliating for earlier attacks on Saudi oil facilities. This military action signals strengthened US-Saudi security cooperation, which may have injected a sliver of optimism into the synthesized read, but it simultaneously escalates regional tensions, further complicating the diplomatic environment needed for Saudi-Israeli normalization. Other events were sports and financial news, irrelevant to the topic.
8. Jul 31, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with no geopolitical or diplomatic events this period shifting the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.; During this period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' remained unchanged at 7.5%, continuing its extremely low level. Although a significant geopolitical event occurred—a drone strike on US-owned LNG ships at Egypt's Damietta port—it did not directly involve Saudi Arabia or Israel, nor did it alter the regional diplomatic landscape. All other high-signal events were football-related news, including personnel changes at clubs owned by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund, which are entirely irrelevant to the Abraham Accords. Consequently, this period lacked any substantive evidence to advance the issue.
9. Aug 1, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with no events this period shifting the likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.; The the synthesized read's likelihood for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027 remained frozen at 7.5% this period. The information environment was completely empty, with no geopolitical, diplomatic, or economic events touching on Saudi-Israeli normalization. With no new evidence to digest, the synthesized read's judgment simply carried forward the prior period's stagnation.
10. Aug 2, 2026 UTC — current likelihood remains flat at 7.5%, with two commercial and sports events this period having no bearing on Saudi-Israeli normalization.; This period, prediction current likelihood for 'Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords before 2027' remained stuck at 7.5%, unchanged from the previous cycle. Two Saudi-related stories entered the information environment—Prince Alwaleed's increased stake in Lucid Motors and Al-Hilal's transfer dispute with Barcelona over João Cancelo—but both belong squarely to the realms of commerce and football, with zero connection to Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations. Absent any geopolitical or diplomatic signal, the synthesized read's judgment simply carried forward its prior stasis.
11. Aug 3, 2026 UTC — current likelihood edges down to 6.5% as US-Iran conflict sees a diplomatic opening, but Saudi Arabia's role remains unclear, keeping normalization prospects at a low level.; This period saw the the synthesized read's likelihood for Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords dip slightly from 7.5% to 6.5%, continuing the low-probability range. The only geopolitically relevant event was Trump's announcement of a suspension of planned US-Israeli strikes on Iran, claiming a preliminary deal framework had been reached. If implemented, such a deal could reshape the Middle East security landscape, but reports made no mention of Saudi Arabia's role or stance, nor any reference to Saudi-Israeli normalization. The other event, concerning FIFA's commercialization reform, was entirely unrelated. The slight likelihood decline likely reflects cautious sentiment toward regional uncertainty rather than a direct judgment on Saudi diplomatic moves.
12. Aug 4, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% as the Gaza ceasefire deal does not involve Saudi Arabia, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remained at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the previous assessment. The sole development was Trump's announcement of a US-brokered, phased disarmament deal for Gaza involving Israeli troop withdrawal and an international stabilization force. While the deal could reshape the regional security landscape if implemented, the reporting made no mention of Saudi Arabia's role, stance, or any normalization with Israel. The absence of any signal directly tied to the core question left the analytical basis entirely unchanged.
13. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no directly relevant developments this period, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords remains at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the previous assessment. The two pieces of information that emerged are unrelated to Saudi-Israeli normalization: one is a power struggle between UEFA and FIFA leadership, and the other is oil price volatility driven by U.S. military strikes on Iran. The former concerns global football governance, while the latter, though touching on Middle Eastern geopolitics, focuses entirely on energy likelihoods and military confrontation, with no mention of Saudi Arabia's diplomatic moves or stance on the Accords. With no signal to advance the normalization process, the basis for judgment remains unchanged.
14. Aug 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no directly relevant developments this period, leaving normalization prospects unchanged.; The current likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords held at a low 6.5% this period, unchanged from the prior assessment. The sole event was the Saudi Public Investment Fund's completion of a record $55 billion acquisition of Electronic Arts, the largest leveraged buyout in history. While the deal involves Jared Kushner's Affinity Partners—Kushner having championed the Abraham Accords during his father-in-law Trump's administration—the coverage focused entirely on deal structure, financing, and gaming industry implications, with no mention of diplomatic signals or political conditions tied to Saudi-Israeli normalization. With no substantive developments to shift the normalization trajectory, the assessment basis remains unchanged.
15. Aug 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5% with no relevant events this period, leaving the normalization outlook unchanged.; No reports or events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The current likelihood remains at a low 6.5%, unchanged from the previous period. With no new information to shift the normalization outlook in either direction, the assessment carries forward unchanged.
16. Aug 8, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged up to 7.5%, but with no new events this period, the assessment basis remains unchanged.; No reports or events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The current likelihood ticked up from 6.5% to 7.5%, but this minor shift lacks concrete information to back it. The assessment basis carries over entirely from the previous period. The normalization outlook remains in low-probability territory, awaiting substantive diplomatic signals for any reassessment.
17. Aug 9, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged down to 6.5%, with the sole event this period unrelated to the Accords, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; The only Saudi-related report this period concerned Saudi clubs pursuing Barcelona's Marc Casadó, a story entirely unrelated to the Abraham Accords or normalization diplomacy. The current likelihood edged down from 7.5% to 6.5%, a minor shift unsupported by any substantive diplomatic signal, leaving the assessment basis unchanged from the prior period. The prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the Accords remains in low-probability territory, pending concrete developments in bilateral relations or regional diplomacy.
18. Aug 10, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with the newly emerged joint defense pact unrelated to the Abraham Accords, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; The sole relevant event this period was Saudi Arabia signing the Mecca Joint Defense Pact with Pakistan and Turkey. The agreement focuses on collective security and military cooperation among the three nations to address regional threats, but its content does not touch on normalization with Israel or the Abraham Accords framework. The current likelihood remains unchanged from the previous period at 6.5%, a low-probability state reflecting that Saudi Arabia's diplomatic priorities remain centered on security alliances rather than reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive diplomatic signals to advance the Accords process.
19. Aug 11, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca joint defense pact confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a clear separation in Saudi Arabia's diplomatic agenda between security alliances and reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
20. Aug 12, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, confirmed in the previous period, remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting the continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its stance on reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
21. Aug 13, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it centers on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its path toward reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
22. Aug 14, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no relevant events this period, leaving the assessment basis unchanged.; No events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged during this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement confirmed in the previous period remains the only recent development, but it focuses on collective security and has no bearing on normalization with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting a continued separation between Saudi Arabia's security alliance agenda and its path toward reconciliation with Israel, with no substantive signals to advance the accord process.
23. Aug 15, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as further details of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement emerge but do not alter the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects.; This period saw further details of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement come to light, confirming that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey will treat an armed attack on any one as an attack on all. The pact focuses on collective security and regional stability, leveraging Saudi financial power, Turkish military capabilities, and Pakistan's nuclear deterrent, but makes no mention of relations with Israel. The current likelihood remains at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi moves on the security front remain distinct from the Abraham Accords process, with no substantive signal toward normalization.
24. Aug 16, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement details disclosed in the prior period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but the pact focuses on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey without addressing ties with Israel. The current likelihood holds at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi security architecture moves remain compartmentalized from the normalization track in the absence of substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
25. Aug 17, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca joint defense pact details disclosed in the prior period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but that agreement centers on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey and does not touch on relations with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi Arabia's security architecture adjustments remain compartmentalized from the normalization track in the absence of any substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
26. Aug 18, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new events this period leaving the baseline assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period. The Mecca Joint Defense Pact details disclosed in the previous period remain the most notable recent geopolitical development, but that agreement centers on collective security arrangements among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey without touching on relations with Israel. The current likelihood holds steady at 6.5%, reflecting that Saudi Arabia's security architecture adjustments remain compartmentalized from the normalization process in the absence of substantive signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
27. Aug 19, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, as escalating Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities show no direct impact on Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects.; This period saw an escalation in Houthi drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's Jazan refinery, but the development primarily reflects the long-running security conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran-backed Houthi forces, without touching on the core issues of Saudi-Israeli normalization. The actual damage was limited, and the refinery had already been shut down due to prior damage, keeping the overall impact on Saudi Arabia's security posture contained. The current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, indicating that intensifying regional security frictions are not yet sufficient to alter the baseline assessment of the normalization process, absent substantive political signals toward Israeli rapprochement.
28. Aug 20, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured during this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was already fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security dynamics and not spilling over into the political process of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing for rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
29. Aug 21, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Absent substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
30. Aug 22, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully absorbed in the last cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Absent substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
31. Aug 23, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
32. Aug 24, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The prior Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully absorbed in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
33. Aug 25, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 6.5%, with no new relevant events this period, leaving the assessment of Saudi-Israeli normalization prospects unchanged.; No new events directly related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords were captured this period. The earlier Houthi attack on the Jizan refinery was fully digested in the previous cycle, with its impact confined to regional security and not spilling over into the political track of Saudi-Israeli normalization. In the absence of substantive diplomatic signals or high-level engagement pushing toward rapprochement, the current likelihood remains flat at 6.5%, reflecting persistently low expectations for a near-term breakthrough.
34. Aug 26, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged up from 6.5% to 8.5%, though no new events emerged this period to substantiate the move.; No new events directly tied to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords surfaced this period. While the synthesized likelihood ticked up from 6.5% to 8.5%, the move lacks traceable news events or diplomatic signals, reflecting statistical fluctuation rather than a fundamental improvement. With no high-level contacts, policy shifts, or third-party mediation breakthroughs on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term outlook remains dim.
35. Aug 27, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged from the prior assessment.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized likelihood remains at a low 8.5%. After the slight uptick in the prior period, the absence of follow-up diplomatic signals or policy moves leaves that level without further reinforcement. With no high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
36. Aug 28, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, leaving the synthesized likelihood unchanged at a low 8.5%. The modest uptick from the prior period has received no follow-through in the form of diplomatic signals or policy moves, depriving that level of further reinforcement. Without high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
37. Aug 29, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 8.5% with no new events this period, leaving the situation unchanged.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized likelihood remains at a low 8.5%. After the slight uptick in the prior period, the absence of follow-up diplomatic signals or policy moves leaves that level without further reinforcement. With no high-level contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the near-term prospects for a breakthrough remain dim.
38. Aug 30, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell from 8.5% to 7.5% with no new events this period, keeping the outlook subdued.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, and the synthesized read shows likelihood edging down from 8.5% to 7.5%. The absence of high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress meant the faint optimism from the prior period could not be sustained. Without concrete signals of movement on Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospects for a deal before 2027 remain very dim.
39. Aug 31, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with no new events this period, extending the low-level stagnation.; No new events related to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords emerged this period, leaving the synthesized likelihood unchanged from the previous period at 7.5%. Two consecutive periods without high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress have left no foothold for even tentative optimism. With no substantive signals of movement toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains very remote.
40. Sep 1, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood holds at 7.5% with only a football transfer story this period, irrelevant to the accord's prospects, extending the low-level stagnation.; The only matched event this period was Al Hilal nearing a deal for Arsenal winger Gabriel Martinelli, a routine sports acquisition by a Saudi club with no bearing on the diplomatic normalization process covered by the Abraham Accords. With multiple consecutive periods lacking high-level diplomatic contacts, public statements, or third-party mediation progress, there is nothing to anchor any optimism. Absent substantive signals of progress in Saudi-Israeli normalization, the prospect of a deal before 2027 remains very dim.