US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 7, 2026?

Earlier updates

1. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood around 37%, indicating the US-Iran conflict persists with a low probability of announcing an end to the blockade in the near term.; Evidence this period shows the US-Iran military conflict continuing at high intensity with no signs of de-escalation. The US has nearly depleted its long-range precision missile stockpile in the five-month war, House Democrats are probing the Pentagon for allegedly manipulating war casualty data, and US retaliatory strikes on Iran continue to drive oil price volatility. These events collectively point to a reality of ongoing intense military confrontation, lacking the political and military conditions for a ceasefire or lifting of the blockade. The current likelihood holds steady at 37%, reflecting this stalemate.
2. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood surged to 53%, but this period lacks new evidence, leaving the shift without an event-driven basis.; No new evidence events related to the US-Iran conflict or the blockade were captured during this period. Despite this, the baseline likelihood reading surged sharply from around 37% to 53%, a swing of 16 percentage points. With no fresh news reports or developments to justify such a significant adjustment, the upward move lacks a traceable event-driven catalyst. In the absence of evidence, the current reading stands in stark contrast to the previous judgment, which was grounded in the ongoing high-intensity military confrontation.
3. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood continued to climb to roughly 65%, yet this period again lacks new evidence, leaving the shift without an event-driven basis.; No new evidence events related to the US-Iran conflict or blockade were captured in this period. Yet the baseline likelihood reading climbed further from 53% at the end of the last period to roughly 65%, a move of nearly 12 percentage points. With no new developments to support it across two consecutive periods, this continued uptrend lacks a traceable event-driven basis. The current reading stands in sharper contrast to the previous judgment made amid an evidence vacuum, suggesting non-event factors are driving the likelihood assessment.
4. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell sharply to roughly 56%, yet this period again lacks new evidence, leaving the shift without an event-driven basis.; No new evidence events related to the US-Iran conflict or blockade were captured in this period. Yet the baseline likelihood reading plunged from 65% at the end of the previous period to roughly 56%, erasing all gains from the prior two periods. With three consecutive periods now lacking any new developments, this sharp decline has no traceable event-driven basis, creating an even starker contrast with the previous judgment made in an evidence vacuum and suggesting that other non-event factors are driving the current likelihood assessment.
5. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood plunged further to roughly 43%, with no new evidence for a fourth straight period, leaving the decline without event-driven support.; No new evidence events related to the US-Iran conflict or blockade emerged in this period, extending the information vacuum to four consecutive windows. Yet the baseline likelihood reading plunged again from 56% to roughly 43%, a single-period drop of 13 percentage points. With zero new developments, this persistent and accelerating decline is sharply disconnected from the evidentiary reality, suggesting the current likelihood assessment is being heavily driven by non-event factors.
6. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood rebounded sharply to roughly 57%, yet no new evidence emerged this period, leaving the upswing without event-driven support.; No new evidence events related to the US-Iran conflict or blockade appeared in this period, extending the information vacuum to a fifth straight window. Yet the baseline likelihood reading rebounded sharply from roughly 43% at the end of the previous period to about 57%, a single-period swing of 14 percentage points. With no new developments whatsoever, this violent snapback mirrors the previous period's plunge, further indicating that the current likelihood assessment is being heavily distorted by non-event-driven factors and is severely disconnected from the evidentiary reality.
7. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell to roughly 51%, as optimism over Iran diplomacy cooled.; One evidence event indirectly related to the Iran situation emerged this period: US stocks hit record highs on expectations of potential US-Iran talks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. However, the event offered no concrete progress on lifting the blockade, merely reflecting optimistic likelihood interpretation. Meanwhile, the baseline likelihood reading fell from roughly 57% at the end of the previous period to about 51%, a drop of nearly 6 percentage points. This pullback suggests the prior period's sharp rebound, which occurred in an information vacuum, lacked sustained momentum, and the current likelihood is converging back toward the reality reflected by the event evidence.
8. Aug 5, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood plunged to roughly 41%, as optimism completely faded.; No new evidence events emerged during this period, leaving a complete information vacuum. The brief optimism ignited in the previous period by a stock likelihood rally proved unsustainable, as the current likelihood plummeted nearly 10 percentage points in just ten minutes, falling from roughly 51% to 41%. This sharp correction completely erased the prior irrational gains, demonstrating the extreme fragility of expectations unsupported by substantive progress, as the synthesized read converges back toward reality.
9. Aug 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood fell further to roughly 34%, as the information vacuum intensified downward pressure.; The complete information vacuum persisted through this period, with no new evidence events emerging. The sharp decline from the previous period, driven by a lack of support, did not halt, as the current likelihood slid another 8 percentage points from roughly 41% to about 34%. With no substantive progress for two consecutive periods, the earlier brief burst of optimism has been fully digested, and the synthesized read continues to converge toward a lower realistic probability.
10. Aug 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood edged up to roughly 37%, but the rebound lacks new evidence and rests on a weak foundation.; This period again saw no new evidence events, marking a third consecutive window of information vacuum. However, the current likelihood did not continue its one-sided decline, instead ticking up about 3 percentage points to around 37%. This event-free rebound resembles a brief technical correction after the prior rapid drop, rather than a substantive reassessment of developments. With no new information injected, the synthesized read on an 'announcement to end the blockade' remains low, as earlier optimism has been largely digested by the persistent information vacuum.
11. Aug 6, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood plunged to roughly 25%, as the information vacuum persists and the prior rebound was fully reversed.; No new evidence events emerged in this period, extending the information vacuum into its fourth consecutive window. In contrast to the prior modest uptick, the current likelihood suffered a sharp sell-off, plunging over 11 percentage points to around 25%, completely erasing the previous period's gains and hitting a new low. This one-sided collapse in the absence of any new information suggests the foundation of the earlier rebound was extremely fragile, and the synthesized read on an 'announcement to end the blockade' has further disintegrated.
12. Aug 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood plummeted to 8.5%, as escalating military tensions and public internal rifts make the prospect of 'announcing an end to the blockade' extremely remote.; Two high-impact evidence events emerged this period, shattering any remaining illusion of a short-term rapprochement. Iran's direct threat of retaliation against Gulf states risks regionalizing the conflict, while the public clash between Trump and Defense Secretary Hegseth over depleted missile stockpiles exposes deep internal divisions over the war's sustainability. These twin forces drove the current likelihood off a cliff, from roughly 25% in the previous period to 8.5%, a drop exceeding 16 percentage points. With military intensity undiminished and diplomatic space squeezed, the US announcing an end to the blockade by the deadline now appears virtually impossible.
13. Aug 7, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood rebounded to 14.1%, but the period lacks new evidence, leaving the bounce unsupported by concrete events.; This brief window was a quiet period that captured no new relevant events. The current likelihood rebounded from 8.5% to 14.1%, a rise of 5.6 percentage points, but this move occurred entirely in an information vacuum, with no new diplomatic signals or military developments to support it. The bounce likely reflects a short-lived correction to the previous period's extreme pessimism rather than any material improvement on the ground. Absent fresh evidence, the prospect of the US announcing an end to the blockade remains dim.
14. Aug 8, 2026 UTC — Current likelihood dropped to zero, with no relevant events occurring in the window.; The information vacuum persisted through this period, with no new diplomatic or military developments captured. The current likelihood plunged from 14.1% to 0%, a drop of 14.1 percentage points. Without any event to drive it, this move completely erased the previous unsupported rebound, returning the assessment to its most pessimistic baseline. In the absence of any positive signals, the prospect of the US announcing an end to the blockade has no visible support.