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What could break US-Yemen ceasefire despite 93.5% odds?
Given the 93.5% market probability that the US-Yemen ceasefire continues through October 15, what developments could still trigger a qualifying US military strike on Yemeni territory before the deadline?
Closing recap
Across 5 public assessments, the state moved from “Public tracking started; no independent probability estimate yet” to “The final market result has been verified; this question is closed”. Final assessment: Final outcomes come from confirmed market winners or on-chain payouts, not a new model forecast
Closing basis
The final public baseline shows US x Yemen ceasefire continues through October 15? 100%. This is a terminal probability signal, not independent news verification or formal settlement.
Final result
The final market result has been verified; this question is closed.
Final result
US x Yemen ceasefire continues through October 15?Closed
Final outcomes come from confirmed market winners or on-chain payouts, not a new model forecast.
How we read it
All linked outcomes verified
Earlier updates
- — Public tracking started; no independent probability estimate yet.; Starting public context: This market will resolve to “No” if the United States takes a qualifying military action against Yemen by the specified date, 11:59 PM Yemen Standard Time. Otherwise this market will resolve to “Yes.” A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by the United States, that directly impacts Yemen. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The qualifying military action must be carried out by the armed forces of the United States. Actions carried out by private military contractors, mercenaries, or proxy forces will not qualify. Where a qualifying action is carried out in the course of a coalition or multinational operation, it will qualify only if the armed forces of the United States directly conducted the strike. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Yemen do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. “Yemen” refers to the terrestrial territory of Yemen, including its internal waters. Yemen’s maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of Yemen as of market creati
- — The most likely outcome is "胡塞武装袭击美国或盟友目标,导致美国报复性打击", with a our assessmentestimate of 89%.; As of October 13, 2026, the Yemen ceasefire has been severely undermined by Houthi military advances: starting September 3, Houthi forces pushed along the Red Sea coast, captured Mocha on September 10, and took Perim Island on September 11, largely controlling Yemen's western coast (evidence 3). Earlier, the July 13, 2026 Sana'a airport airstrike had shattered the nearly four-year ceasefire, with government forces and Houthis clashing on multiple fronts (evidence 2). These events indicate the ceasefire has effectively collapsed, but the supplied evidence does not explicitly mention a specific US military strike on Yemeni territory, nor whether Houthis directly attacked US or allied targets. Thus, the market prediction (high probability of ceasefire continuation) may fail due to ongoing Houthi offensives or potential US retaliatory strikes, but the specific trigger remains unclear.
- — The most likely outcome is "胡塞武装袭击美国或盟友目标,导致美国报复性打击", with a our assessmentestimate of 81%.; As of October 14, 2026, the Yemen ceasefire has already collapsed due to the July 2026 Sana'a airport airstrike and the Houthi capture of Mokha and Perim Island in September, with government forces and Houthis clashing across multiple fronts and Red Sea shipping disrupted. These events show the ceasefire has broken down, but the supplied evidence does not explicitly mention specific U.S. military strikes on Yemeni territory or whether U.S. actions directly triggered the collapse. Thus, the market prediction that the ceasefire continues through October 15 may be invalidated by the ongoing conflict, but the evidence is insufficient to confirm whether the U.S. has launched such strikes.
- — The most likely outcome is "胡塞武装袭击美国或盟友目标,导致美国报复性打击", with a our assessmentestimate of 86%.; As of October 15, 2026, the supplied evidence shows the Yemen ceasefire has repeatedly broken down: Houthi missile attacks on Israel in June 2026, an airstrike on Sanaa airport in September, and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia with hundreds of Saudi airstrikes in early October. These events indicate the ceasefire has failed, but the evidence does not explicitly mention a specific US military strike on Yemeni territory, nor whether these events directly triggered US retaliation. Therefore, this report cannot confirm whether the ceasefire continued through October 15, nor whether the US launched a strike that would invalidate it. The key uncertainty is whether the US will take military action in response to Houthi attacks or regional escalation.
- — The final market result has been verified; this question is closed.; Final outcomes come from confirmed market winners or on-chain payouts, not a new model forecast.